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Abstract 
Background:  In  recent  years surgical  errors have received increasing attention and so
called ‘never events’ include wrong site/side/patient surgery. Both the Joint Commission
and  the  World  Health  Organisation  have  sought  to  reduce  the  risk  of  these  events
occurring with the introduction of the Universal Protocol (Joint Commission International,
2004)  and  Guidelines  for  Safe  Surgery:  safe  surgery  saves  lives  (World  Health
Organisation, 2007).  Despite these initiatives, surgical never events continue to occur.
Context: This Organisational Development (OD) project aimed to align the organisations
‘Time Out’ process with the WHO directive that ‘Time Out’ occurs immediately prior to knife
to skin. Using action research based on the Senior & Swales (2010) OD model for change,
the current situation was diagnosed through audit, informal interviews, internal data review,
assessment of current literature and survey data of the practices in other private hospitals
in Ireland. The future state which is envisioned is to never have a surgical ‘never event’ in
our  organisation.   Commitment  to  our  vision  was  gained  through  management
sponsorship, stakeholder analysis, support of champions, presentations and discussions
with surgeons and staff. Developing an action plan was the remit of the implementation
team who agreed the PDSA methodology. The change was implemented through pilot of
surgical procedures and was audited throughout the process. Evaluation found that there
was a 6% decrease in the ability to confirm the patient identity and a 42% reduction in the
visibility  of  the  site  mark.  While  overall  the  objectives  of  the  project  were  achieved,
feedback from surgeons and staff was that the proposed change increased the likelihood
of  ‘wrong  site  surgery’  and  should  not  be  implemented.  However,  opportunities  for
improvement in regard to scheduling of surgeries, confirmation of imaging and improved
site marking practices were identified.  Finally the writer concludes that further study is
required on ‘Time Out’ and the apparent disconnect between theory and practice.
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1.1 Introduction
The statement  attributed  to  Professor  Arthur  Bloomfield  (1888-  1962)  that:  ‘There  are
some  patients  that  we  cannot  help;  there  are  none  whom  we  cannot  harm’  (2004)
recognised the possibility of healthcare practitioners causing patient harm well in advance
of the seminal works of the Institute of Medicine (IOM, 1999). 
Today’s healthcare is highly complex. Care is often delivered in a fast-moving, pressurised
environment. Sometimes unintended harm occurs during a procedure or as a result of a
clinical decision. Unfortunately sometimes the injury to the patient is life changing or at its
worst, life ending.
Surgical errors have received increasing attention in recent years and some have been
defined as ‘never events’. The term ‘never event’ was first introduced in 2001 by Ken Kiser,
MD, former CEO of the National Quality Forum (NQF), in reference to particularly shocking
medical errors such as wrong-site surgery (Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality).
Since then, both the Joint Commission and the World Health Organisation have sought to
address  this  issue  with  the  introduction  of  both  the  Universal  Protocol  for  Preventing
Wrong Site, Wrong Procedure, Wrong Person Surgery (Joint Commission International,
2004)  and  Guidelines  for  Safe  Surgery:  safe  surgery  saves  lives  (World  Health
Organisation, 2007).  Despite these initiatives, surgical ‘never events’ continue to occur,
albeit that evaluations of the WHO checklist have been positive (O’Connor et al., 2013).  
1.2 Organisational Context
The writer’s organisation is a 120 bedded private hospital which provides a wide range of
elective medical and surgical services. The hospital currently admits 18,000 patients per
annum, comprising 6,000 in-patients and 12,000 day-cases. The majority of patients are
surgical, undergoing elective surgical procedures. The organisation was first accredited by
Joint Commission International in 2005 and has retained its “Accredited Hospital” status
since then. 
1.3 Rationale for selecting the Project.
The Joint Commission International Accreditation (JCI) Standards for Hospitals mandates
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 that  hospitals  develop  and  implement  a  process  for  ensuring  correct  site,  correct
procedure and correct patient surgery (JCI, 2014). The writer’s organisation continuously
strives to maintain compliance with their accreditation standards. 
Evidence-based practices are described in The Joint Commission’s Universal Protocol for
Preventing  Wrong  Site,  Wrong  Procedure,  Wrong  Person  Surgery™.  The  essential
processes found in the Universal Protocol are:
 marking the surgical site;
 a preoperative verification process; and
 a time-out that is held immediately before the start of a procedure.
The World Health Organisations Second Global Patient Safety Challenge: Safe Surgery
Saves Lives addresses the safety of surgical care. The World Alliance for Patient Safety
initiated work on the Challenge in January 2007.
The focus of the challenge is the WHO Safe Surgery Checklist. The checklist identifies
three phases of an operation, each corresponding to a specific period in the normal flow of
work: Before the induction of anaesthesia (Sign in), before the incision of the skin (‘Time
Out’) and before the patient leaves the operating room (Sign out) (WHO, 2007).  In this
regard, the checklist goes further than the JCI standards in stating that the ‘Time Out’ is
conducted  immediately  prior  to  knife  to  skin.  The  current  practice  in  the  writer’s
organisation is to conduct ‘Time Out’ prior to painting and draping of the patient and this
practice was viewed by JCI at time of last survey as not in line with the direction of the
WHO. 
In Ireland, the timing of surgical ‘Time Out’ is less well defined. The national policy and
procedure for safe surgery states that, while before skin incision is the recommended time
to  complete  the  ‘Time  Out’  based  on  the  WHO  recommendations,   if  individual
organisations wish to perform the ‘Time Out’ prior  to skin preparation and draping the
patient, this policy may be adapted locally (Quality and Patient Safety Directorate, 2013). 
This poses a challenge for the writer’s organisation. The World Health Organisation
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direction is that ‘Time Out’ occurs immediately prior to knife to skin and therefore it is the
expectation of our accrediting body that we align ourselves to the Surgical Safety initiative.
As  it  is  also  a  JCI  International  Patient  Safety Goal  (IPSG)  and  any ‘not  met’ in  the
measurable element of an IPSG results in an automatic focused survey, the organisation is
very keen to progress change on this issue. However nationally, the practices in regard to
the timing of ‘Time Out’ are less clear and it will be vital to the success of this proposed
change  that  it  can  be  clearly  demonstrated  that  the  change  will  indeed  lead  to  an
improvement in patient safety.  
1.4 Aims and Objectives
The overall aim of this proposed quality improvement is to align the organisations surgical
‘Time Out’ process with the World Health Organisation (WHO) directive by March 2016
ensuring that ‘Time Out’ occurs immediately prior to knife to skin in 100% of surgeries. 
In order to achieve this aim, the following objectives were identified:
Objective  1:  To complete  a  stakeholder  analysis  by October  2015 and agree an
implementation team. 
This analysis will  enable the writer to identify everyone with a concern or interest who
needs to be involved in the planned improvement (Appendix 2). 
Objective 2:  To conduct an observation audit of ‘Time Out’ practices by September
2016 to identify the current situation.
The purpose of this audit is to establish a baseline, assess present practices and identify
opportunities to improve
Objective 3: To conduct interviews with both surgeons and staff  on the present
state and their vision for the future by November 2015.
Conducting informal interviews with both surgeons and clinical nurse managers will identify
their views and concerns and possible resistance to change.
Objective 4: To complete a review of the literature by December 2015
The purpose of the literature review is to provide stakeholders with a succinct, objective
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 and logical summary of the current knowledge on ‘Time Out’. It will also have an important
function  in  evaluating  current  practice  and  making  recommendations  for  policy
development and change.
Objective  5:  To  conduct  a  survey  of  other  private  hospitals  by  March  2016  to
ascertain their practices in regard to ‘Time Out’. 
Establishing practices in regard to ‘Time Out’ in other private hospitals will give context to
the organisations own practices in this regard. 
Objective 6:  To implement change of practice using the Plan, Do, Study, Act (PDSA)
quality improvement cycle by March 2016. 
This will  involve piloting  the introduction of a further secondary ‘Time Out’ immediately
prior to knife to skin and measuring both to ascertain compliance with criteria for ‘Time
Out’. 
Objective 7:  To roll out the improvement programme as evidenced by:
 Policy revision and approval by March 31st 2016
 Education of all relevant staff on change of practice by March 31st 2016
 See Appendix 1 for Project Plan  
1.5 Role of the student in the process.
One of the writer’s main responsibilities in the organisation is to implement best practices,
quality  improvement  initiatives  and  promote  patient  safety.  During  the  hospital
accreditation survey in 2014 there was detailed discussion with the survey team in regard
to the timing of ‘Time Out’ and it was agreed that as Quality lead, the writer would plan to
implement a change in this process prior to the next accreditation survey in 2017. This will
be done with the support of the relevant stakeholders and the process will be facilitated by
the use of quality improvement tools including PDSA, brainstorming, mind mapping and
stakeholder analysis. 
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1.6 Organisational impact and expected outcome(s).
1.6.1 Organisational impact:
It is anticipated that this change project will strengthen the safety of the surgical practices
and decrease the likelihood of wrong site, side or patient surgery. 
1.6.2 Planned Outcome: 
100% of surgical patients will have ‘Time Out’ conducted immediately prior to knife to skin
in accordance with the WHO Surgical Safety initiative. 
1.7 Potential threats to implementation.
The writer’s organisation originally introduced the surgical ‘Time Out’ in 2006, becoming
one of  the first  hospitals  in  the country to  do so.  At  the time none of  the other  local
hospitals had implemented a similar process and as many of the consultants worked in
more  than  one  location,  there  was  initially  strong  resistance  to  its  implementation.
Highlighting some of the near misses which had occurred, identifying champions among
the  surgeons  and  ensuring  buy  in  by  the  nursing  staff  were  key  to  its  successful
introduction.  
Through this process much time and effort was expended on ensuring that ‘Time Out’ was
consistently performed and took place only when the whole team was present. The timing
of ‘Time Out’ seemed less significant and evolved into the present practice of conducting
‘Time Out’ prior to painting and draping because it was perceived to be the safest time to
do so. 
Changing the perceptions of Consultants that ‘Time Out’ is best conducted after the patient
is draped will be challenging, as will getting buy in from nursing staff. From the writer’s
experience, changing a practice which has been in embedded will require the weight of
empirical evidence and the ability to demonstrate to consultants and staff that the change
will in fact further decrease the likelihood of wrong site, side or patient surgery. 
Chapter two will review the available literature on surgical ‘Time Out’ and provide a critique
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of the literature in this area. It will outline the implications for the project and offer evidence
to support the rationale for the change. It will conclude with a brief overall summary of the
findings from the literature. 
Chapter three details the Organisational Development methodology structured using the
Senior & Swailes model (2010) for change while incorporating a PDSA cycle. Chapter four
includes  a  brief  discussion  on  the  importance  of  healthcare  evaluation,  outlines  the
methods  of  evaluation  employed  and  details  the  analysis  carried  out.  The  writer  has
identified the need to evaluate the following:
1) Results of observational audit of ‘Time Out’.
2) Findings from staff and consultant interviews prior to the introduction of the change
project 
3) Results of a survey of private hospitals on their practices in regard to ‘Time Out’.  
4) Audit  results  to  demonstrate  whether  this  change  effectively  meets  the
requirements for a complete ‘Time Out’. 
5) Feedback of staff and consultants on the change. 
Chapter  five  draws  together  the  findings  from  this  project,  the  authors  experience  in
introducing the change and its relationship to the literature. It concludes with a discussion
of the impact of this project on the organisation and explores recommendations for future
improvements. 
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2. Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
This literature review evaluates the available evidence in regard to surgical ‘Time Out’ and
the World Health Organisation (WHO) Surgical Safety Checklist.
2.2 Search Strategy
A systematic  literature  search  was  conducted  of  MEDLINE  at  EbscoHost,   CINAHL,
EMBASE, Web of Science and the Cochrane Database using a search strategy developed
in collaboration with a medical librarian. The search strategy included studies published
from January 2006 to March 2016, and used a combination of medical subject headings
and  keywords  related  to  “surgical”,  “‘Time  Out’”,  “surgical  pause”,  “medical  errors
prevention  and  control”,  “operative  standards”,  “guidelines”,  “wrong  site  surgery”,  “site
marking”,  “never  events”  and  “checklists”.  Google  scholar  was  also  used  to  follow
references found in the bibliographies of the selected articles.  This allowed the writer to
identify seminal articles in this area. Seventy two articles were considered relevant to the
themes identified. 
2.3 Review Themes
The themes for the literature review were identified through interview with both consultants
and staff and preliminary searches by the writer. The themes identified as most relevant to
the change project were: Never events/Wrong patient, site or side surgery, the Universal
Protocol for correct patient, site or side surgery, Checklists and Site marking. 
2.3.1. Never Events – Wrong patient, wrong site, wrong side surgery
“Primum non nocere” (first do no harm): Hippocrates (c. 460 BC-377 BC).
With more than 200 million surgical procedures carried out worldwide each year, reports
reveal  that  adverse event rates remain unacceptably high,  despite a number of  global
safety initiatives over the past decade (Kim  et al., 2015).  The term wrong-site surgery
refers to any surgical procedure performed on the wrong patient, wrong body part, wrong
side of the body, or at the wrong level of the correctly identified anatomic site (JCAHO,
2004).  It  represents  some  of  the  worst  medical  errors  that  patients  and  surgeons
experience (Seiden & Barach, 2006).
11
Since the  late  1990s there  have been a  number  of  interventions identified  to  try  and
eliminate the possibility of performing wrong site surgery. These included the ‘Sign Your
Site’  campaign,  advocating  that  orthopaedic  surgeons  initial  the  surgical  site  before
surgery  and  ‘SMaX’  guidelines  for  signing,  marking,  and  ensuring  availability  of
radiography before  surgery  (Ragusa  et  al.,  2016). In  2004,  the  Joint  Commission  on
Accreditation of Healthcare Organization developed the Universal Protocol which included
preoperative verification of the patient and the site, surgical site marking  and a ‘Time Out’
before any planned surgical procedure (JCAHO., 2004). The Universal Protocol became
mandatory for all hospitals accredited by the Commission. 
Further initiatives include the ‘100,000 Lives Campaign’ (2005/2006) and subsequent ‘5
Million Lives Campaign’ (2007/2008) by the Institute for Healthcare Improvement (IHI), the
Surgical  Care  Improvement  Project  (Kim  et  al.,  2015).  In  2009,  the  World  Health
Organization (WHO) established the WHO Safe Surgery Checklist.  This checklist was a
product of the WHO Second Global Patient Safety Challenge ‘Safe Surgery Saves Lives’
campaign (WHO, 2009). The checklist identifies 3 stages: (1) the “sign-in” phase, before
the induction of anaesthesia; (2) the “time-out” phase, before the surgical incision; and (3)
the “sign-out” phase, before the patient leaves the operating room (WHO, 2009). 
Also in 2009 the Joint Commission expanded the Universal Protocol to include availability
of imaging and to ensure that required documents and specialised medical technology are
on hand, correct and functional. They further prioritized implementation of the Universal
Protocol by designating it as a Patient Safety Goal (Ragusa et al., 2016).
These strategies were driven by the desire to reduce wrong patient, site, or side surgery
and  also  to  save  lives  and  improve  surgical  patient  outcomes.  They are  built  on  the
premise that while a highly protective layer of staff and processes protects the patient from
harm, described by Reason (1990) in the  swiss cheese model where opportunities for
error occur when the holes in many slices briefly align. These strategies try to minimise the
likelihood  of  such  alignment.  Unfortunately,  despite  these  efforts,  statistics  for  wrong-
patient, wrong-site, wrong-procedure events reviewed by the Joint Commission shows little
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improvement in the number of events reported (Joint Commission, 1995-2015). (Appendix
3) Recurring reports highlight the continued occurrence of wrong-site and wrong-patient
procedures in the United States (Stahel, 2014).
So why are these events still happening? Following wrong patient, site or side surgery,
hospitals invariably conduct a root cause analysis to identify, diminish and where possible,
eliminate the root and contributory causes of the event. This intense investigation usually
results in a set of actions or programs intended to prevent a reoccurrence (Michaels et al.,
2007).  In a 2009 study of actual and near miss wrong site occurrences, Blanco  et al.
(2009) found that: in 63% of actual wrong site occurrences, the verification was not done;
in 61%, the ‘Time Out’ was not done; and in 56% of occurrences, the surgical mark was
not visible during ‘Time Out’. Another study identified transcription errors in documents and
omitting steps in verification, as main areas of vulnerability (Abecassis, 2015).
Seiden (2006) identifies confusion regarding laterality as a cause of wrong site or side
occurrences.  Surgeons are used to their ‘right’ being their patient’s ‘left’, when facing a
patient. However it can be very challenging during surgery in the theatre, when the patient
is  covered in  sterile  drapes or  the patient’s  position is  changed during the procedure,
perhaps rotated onto one side with limbs flexed.  It can necessitate considerable mental
effort for the surgeon to identify right from left. It is not surprising that laterality could be
subject  to  error,  especially  in  a  distraction  rich  environment  (Seiden,  2006).  The
Pennsylvanian Patient Safety Authority encourage communication from all team members
on this issue and point out that the anaesthetist may be the only person in the theatre
whose view of the patient is the same as their physical orientation (Authority, Pennsylvania
Patient  Safety, 2008). 
Wrong  patient  surgery  highlights  the  need  for  correct  patient  identification;  ensuring
wristbands are accurate and used correctly during the preoperative verification process
and ‘Time Out’ (Blanco, 2009). It is being increasingly recognized that involvement of the
patient  in  the verification process can decrease the likelihood of  wrong site or person
surgery, but patient factors such as language barriers,  fear or disease acuity have been
known to contribute to error (Hanchanale et a.l, 2014).
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DeVine et al. (2010) identified such contributing factors to wrong site surgery as: incorrect
patient  positioning;  incorrect  preparation  of  operative  site;  patient  providing  incorrect
information;  incorrect  patient  consent;  lack of  site  markings;  surgeon fatigue;   multiple
procedures on same patient; unusual time pressures; unusual patient anatomy; and poor
communication.
A  frequently  reported  cause  of  wrong-site  surgery  across  analyses  identified
communication  problems  such  as:  miscommunications;  missing  information;  staff  not
speaking up when they noticed that a procedure targeted the wrong side; and a surgeon
ignoring those who questioned laterality (Hempel et al., 2015). The Pennsylvania  Patient
Safety  Authority  highlight  the  importance  of  individuals  in  the  surgical  team  feeling
confident to question the decision of any other team member concerning issues regarding
patient identity, procedure, site, side and availability of equipment or implants (Authority,
Pennsylvania  Patient Safety, 2008). Lee et al. (2013) emphasise the need to eliminate the
hierarchy in operating rooms, so that all staff feel free to speak up when a patient safety
issue is noticed. Others focus on the positive impacts of medical team training on theatre
team communication, resulting in the avoidance of undesirable events through increased
preoperative briefings, postoperative debriefings, improved perceptions of teamwork and
patient safety (Neily, 2011).
In more recent years, attention has widened to outside of the operating theatres and to a
more  expansive  review  of  the  complete  patient  pathway  for  surgery.  Analysis  of  the
patient’s pathway has highlighted potential errors in the administrative and medical care.
An early error in scheduling detail or an incorrect x-ray report can be the starting point for a
wrong diagnosis (Abecassis, 2015; Hadjipavlou & Marshall, 2013).
A study conducted by Paull et al. (2015) demonstrated that 16% of wrong surgery events
were  due  to  errors  that  occur  upstream  or  downstream  to  the  universal  protocol
highlighting the need to enlarge the safety net. Between 2004 and 2013, the Pennsylvania
Patient Safety Authority received 541 reports of wrong site procedures. A review of these
reports  reveals  that  11% experienced  wrong  site  surgery  due  to  the  facility  receiving
incorrect or incomplete information from the surgeon’s office (Clarke, 2014). Cobb (2012)
argues that the first line of defence against error is the preoperative verification process
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which unfortunately can be flawed by mistakes weeks or even months before the planned
surgery. Most hospitals do not cross check the scheduled procedure with the surgeon’s
history and physical and other preoperative notes, thus failing to make this first step of the
process fool proof (Cobb, 2012).
There  are  significant  difficulties  in  conducting  research  designed  to  evaluate  the
effectiveness of  interventions intended to  reduce wrong patient,  site or  side surgeries.
Despite its potentially devastating consequences and given the relatively low incidence of
these events, large numbers of participants would be required to show a significant effect
from any intervention (Algie, 2015). Perhaps as suggested by Hollnagel et al. (2015), the
focus of future investigation should not be on what went wrong but on understanding how
things usually go right. This move from Safety-1 to Safety-11 (Hollnagel et al., 2015), is a
paradigm shift  from ensuring as few things as possible go wrong to ensuring as many
things as possible go right.If a surgical never event occurs in approximately one in every
17,000 operations, that means that in 16,999 operations the processes worked. This lends
weight to the notion that healthcare organisations have huge opportunity to learn from
what has gone well and from when never events have not occurred (Moppett & Moppett,
2016).
2.3.2. Universal protocol 
The Universal Protocol is a three-step process which includes verification, site marking
and ‘Time Out’ (JCAHO, 2004). It was launched as a standard by the Joint Commission
with the intent of reducing the occurrence of wrong-site and wrong patient surgery (Stahel,
2014).
Step 1. Verification: 
This step consists of confirming the correct patient, site and procedure at every stage from
the time a decision is made to operate to the time the patient undergoes the operation.
Verification takes place:
• when the procedure is scheduled;
• at the time of admission or entry to the operating theatre;
• any time the responsibility for care of the patient is transferred to another person 
and:
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• before the patient leaves the preoperative area or enters the procedure room.
Verification should involve the patient and requires correct identification of the patient and
confirming  the  site,  laterality  and  procedure  by  checking  the  patient’s  records  and
radiographs. This is an active process that must include all members of the team involved
in  the  patient’s  care (JCAHO,  2004).  The  rational  for  conducting  a  pre-operative
verification is to reduce risk. Each patient is unequivocally identified by an identification
bracelet which includes the patient’s name, date of birth and medical record number. The
consent form is checked to ensure that the procedure outlined is what is intended. The
surgical  site  mark  is  also  confirmed with  the  patient  before  they are  brought  into  the
operating room (Stahel, 2014).
Step 2. Site Marking: 
The Universal Protocol states that the site or sites to be operated on must be marked in
cases of laterality,  multiple  structures (e.g.  fingers,  toes,  ribs) and multiple  levels (e.g.
vertebral column). The protocol stipulates that marking must be:
• at or next to the operative site; non-operative sites should not be marked;
• unambiguous, clearly visible and made with a permanent marker so that the mark is
not removed during site preparation;
• made by the surgeon performing the procedure and;
• completed, where possible, with the patient’s involvement. (JCAHO, 2004).
The Joint Commission views failure to engage the patient as one of the causes of wrong-
site  surgery  (JCAHO,  2004).  However  pitfalls  in  surgical  site  marking  represents  an
important  underlying  root  cause contributing  to  the  risk  of  wrong site  surgery  (Stahel,
2014). These pitfalls include: the delegation of site marking to someone not involved in the
surgery; using an X to mark the correct site; marking the wrong site based on incorrect
information; the use of non-permanent markers; and imprecise site marking (Stahel, 2014).
Step 3. ‘Time Out’: 
The ‘‘Time Out’ or ‘surgical pause’ is a brief pause just before starting the procedure to
confirm the patient, the procedure and the site of operation. It is also an opportunity to
ensure that the patient is correctly positioned and that any necessary implants or special
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equipment  are  available.  The Joint  Commission  stipulates  that  all  team members  are
actively involved in this process. Any concerns or inconsistencies must be clarified at this
stage. The checks during the ‘Time Out’ must be documented, potentially in the form of a
checklist,  but  the  universal  protocol  leaves  the  design  and  delivery  to  individual
organizations (JCAHO, 2004).  The ‘Time Out’ also serves to foster communication among
team  members  (WHO,  2009).  Key  parameters  for  a  successful  ‘Time  Out’  include  a
standardised  process,  full  team  participation,  suspension  of  routine  activities  and  the
process repeated where a secondary procedure is being performed on the same patient.
Stahel (2014) promotes a two-tiered process, referring to the verification as an ‘awake
‘Time Out’’ followed by a repeat ‘Time Out’ immediately prior to knife to skin, with the intent
of avoiding painting and draping of the wrong surgical site.
Despite  widespread implementation of  the universal  protocol  in the United States,  this
standardised practice has failed to prevent never events from happening (Stahel, 2014). In
a systematic review DeVine (2010) found that there was no literature to substantiate the
effectiveness of the universal protocol for decreasing the rate of wrong site, wrong level
surgery. During a six-and- a-half-year study period before and after implementation of the
universal  protocol,  a  total  of  25  wrong-patient  and  107  wrong-site  procedures  were
identified. The main root causes leading to wrong-patient surgery were errors in diagnosis
(56%) and in communication (100%), whereas wrong-site occurrences were related to
errors in judgment (85%) and the lack of performing a surgical ‘Time Out’ (72%). It appears
that  despite  the  widespread  mandatory  use  of  a  strict  protocol-driven  approach  the
universal protocol does not keep patients safe (Stahel, 2014).
This  perhaps  adds  weight  to  the  Paull  et  al. (2015)  concept  of  errors  upstream and
downstream to the universal protocol. This study identified that some errors can occur
before the beginning of the universal protocol process on the day of surgery (upstream)
e.g. incorrect details forwarded from doctors office, mislabelling of images and selection of
wrong lens, or after the completion of the time-out (downstream) e.g. wrong procedure
performed.
No  amount  of  adherence  to  the  universal  protocol  will  prevent  the  surgeon  getting
distracted mentally and drifting from the intended procedure. Examples include doing a
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total hysterectomy and bilateral salpingo-oophorectomy when the intended procedure was
a  simple  hysterectomy,  or  performing  a  tonsillectomy  and  adenoidectomy  when  the
intended procedure was an adenoidectomy (Clarke,  2015).  The ability of  the universal
protocol  to  prevent  wrong surgery can be strengthened by confirming all  preoperative
documents with their primary sources for the critical information. In addition, everyone on
the team should maintain a memory of the intended procedure and monitor what is being
done throughout the surgery, not just during the ‘Time Out’ (Clarke, 2015). 
As previously stated, events such as wrong-site operations are too rare to measure as
rates. Instead,  hospitals often measure safety and quality protocol  compliance through
peer audits,  questionnaires,  or  chart  audits.  While  audits  and questionnaires  will  yield
some  data,  these  strategies  alone  do  not  capture  compliance  outside  of  what  is
documented (Logan et al., 2012). Areas of concern include surgeon and staff behaviour,
poor communication, room traffic and distractions, and the lack of cultural strategies to
prevent the errors (Conrardy et al., 2010). 
 
Based on an integrative review of literature, Conrardy et al. (2010) argues that the current
state of the science for implementation of the universal protocol varies from organisation to
organisation. Variations included different adaptations of the universal protocol elements
and inconsistent compliance with the actual process. They determined that organisations
that  were successful  in  the implementation of  the universal  protocol  had the following
elements:  a  multidisciplinary  team  approach  throughout  the  universal  protocol
implementation  process;  active  staff  and  patient  participation;  supportive  hospital
management;  and dynamic  communication  that  promotes a  healthy work  environment
(Conrardy et al., 2010). 
Stahel (2014) argues that the continuing expansion of the ‘Time Out’ to include secondary
safety issues, such as antibiotic and venous thromboembolism prophylaxis  (‘expanded’
‘Time Out’), has diluted the intent of the universal protocol in its core essence and likely
contributes to decreased compliance and credibility of the protocol related to the ‘buy-in’ by
the surgical team.  
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2.3.3. Checklists
‘Operating on a human being is an extraordinarily complex and orchestrated task that
requires attentiveness to detail and situational awareness by all team members. Checking
a box is no substitute for critical thinking’ (Wang & Ser, 2014 p.15 ).
This literature review has outlined the progression of safety initiatives in regard to surgery
and the history of the WHO Guidelines for Safe Surgery including the introduction of the
Surgical Safety Checklist.  The checklist comprises of a list of actions to be taken before
induction of anaesthesia, before skin incision and before the patients leaves the operating
room (WHO, 2009).
Figure 1. WHO Surgical Safety Checklist
In  2009,  a  major study by the WHO in conjunction with  the Harvard School  of  Public
Health demonstrated a significant improvement in surgical morbidity from 11% to 7% and
mortality  from 1.5% to  0.8% (Haynes  et  al.,  2009).  However  a  more  recent  study in
Ontario,  Canada  found  that  there  was  no  significant  difference  in  mortality  rates  or
complication rates following surgical  checklist  implementation (Urbach et  al.,   2014).  A
change effort such as the introduction of the WHO checklist can only be successful when
there is a link drawn between the ‘explaining why’ and the individual's perception of what is
of value (Rydenfält et al., 2013).
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Some commentators believe that the emphasis on checklists is a distraction from how
safer care is really achieved. Bosk  et al. (2009) argues that widespread deployment of
checklists without an understanding of how or why they work could be a potential threat to
patients’ safety and to high-quality care. Wang & Ser (2014) believes that while there is no
harm in  spending  one  to  two  minutes  ensuring  that  the  constituents  of  a  successful
procedure are in order, reliance on checklists beyond this should be avoided. 
O’Connor  et  al.  (2013)  found  that  the  overall  attitudes  towards  the  checklist  from
respondents  were  overwhelmingly  positive.  Another  survey  of  704  theatre  staff  also
showed that a large majority of the responders thought that confirmation of patient identity,
correct  procedure,  correct  side and checking of allergies or  contagious diseases were
‘very important’ before the start of surgery (Nilsson et al,  2010).  An interview study with
operating room staff conducted across 10 hospitals in UK identified the following as crucial
to successful  implementation of the checklist:   modification of the initiative to the local
context;  education  around  the  evidence  base;  training  on  the  practical  application;
identifying  champions;  ensuring  buy-in  from  senior  clinical  staff;  involvement  of
management; and auditing and feedback of data to staff (Russ et a.l, 2015).
All members of the theatre team must be involved in the checklist procedure so that it is a
true multidisciplinary intervention. Anaesthetists’ attitudes towards the application of the
checklist have been found to be less positive than those of surgeons or nurses. O’Connor
et al. (2013) recommends that discussions are held with anaesthetists in order to identify a
time in which they are able to be involved in the checklist process. 
Lingard  (2008)  identified  barriers  that  threaten  the  consistent  uptake  of  a  new
communication routine like the briefings outlined in the checklist.  These include the notion
of  individual  excellence;  chronic  staff  shortages,  educational  duties,  and  economic
pressures. When poorly used, the checklist can potentially have a harmful effect on safety
and teamwork in the operating theatre (Lingard, 2008). Surgeons and anaesthetists can
sometimes give the impression that the checklist  is  delaying time, putting pressure on
nurses  to  ensure  that  items  are  covered  quickly.  Dismissive  replies  (affirmative  and
inaccurate) often go unchallenged by other staff (Vats et al., 2010). In a direct observation
study, the time-out section of the checklist was usually attempted, but the sign-out section
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was  not.  Three  simple  measures  were  used  to  assess  how  well  the  time-out  was
performed, and satisfactory performance on all three measures occurred in only 38·5 % of
observed operations (Pickering et al., 2013). 
Training programmes represent positive first steps in providing surgeons in Ireland with the
teamwork knowledge and skills required to effectively lead a surgical team. However, a
single training course, completed once in an individual’s career is unlikely to result in a
sustained cultural shift. There is a need for continuous reinforcement of good teamwork
behaviours in the operating theatre, as well as the involvement of other members of the
surgical team (O’Connor et al., 2012). Allowing teams to customise the implementation of
evidence locally, and challenge assumptions about whom has relevant knowledge, who
counts as an expert,  and who is  able  and ought  to  act  to  improve safety will  greatly
enhance the adoption of these patient safety measures (Bosk et al., 2009).
The surgical safety checklist with its suite of actions goes beyond the universal protocol
and includes measures aimed at reducing surgical complications and mortality as well as
wrong site surgery (WHO, 2009).  A survey of staff  attitudes toward the introduction of
‘Time Out’ showed that >90% of theatre team members believed that it increases patient
safety  (Rydenfält  et  al.,  2013).   However  the  direction  that  “‘Time  Out’”  should  be
conducted  immediately  prior  to  knife  to  skin  is  not  without  its  challenges.  Some staff
pointed  out  the  futility  of  checking  a  patient’s  identity  when  “‘Time  Out’”  occurs  after
painting  and  draping  as  the  name  bands  cannot  be  accessed  without  compromising
sterility.  Some  teams  have  tried  to  perform the  time-out  checks  before  the  patient  is
draped, but this may also prove challenging because this period is often the busiest with
staff doing tasks away from the patient (Vats et al., 2010).
There is no question that the right checklist, with the right design and implementation, can
be used enthusiastically by staff and can be extremely effective. But, unless attention is
paid to the more complex narrative for how they emerged in other industries, including the
changes required to culture, teamwork and design, there is little chance of realising similar
benefits in healthcare (Catchpole & Russ, 2015).
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2.3.4 Site marking 
Site marking has, since the late 1990s been identified by orthopaedic groups, the Joint
Commission, the Institute for Healthcare Improvement and the WHO as crucial to reducing
the risk of wrong site/side surgery (Kim et al., 2015; Ragusa et al., 2016). In a study of 28
surgeons’ ability to identify the correct side in procedures involving laterality without a site
mark, the surgeons correctly identified the operated side in 76.5% by patients name and in
87% by looking at patients' faces, illustrating the likelihood of error in the absence of a site
mark (Pikkel et al., 2014).
Yet in a systematic review of wrong site surgery, Abecassis (2015) found thirteen studies
that  identified the surgical-site  marking process in and of itself  as the point  of  failure.
Failings included:  ambiguous markings; markings being washed off during prepping or
transferred onto another part of the body; the mark being covered after prepping; and the
patient confirming the wrong site. 
One of the failures outlined is the possibility of the site mark being subject to fading or
erasure during skin preparation. Despite a lack of consensus on the best skin preparation
solution, patient safety experts recommend the use of chlorhexidine-based solutions for
infection control purposes  as surgical skin preparation agents (Thakkar & Mears, 2012).
However in a randomized clinical trial they found that chlorhexidine-based skin preparation
solutions erase surgical site markings more frequently than does an iodine-based solution.
The removal of surgical site markings creates a major problem for performing an accurate
‘Time Out’ by the surgeon and the team, in addition to being an essential  concern for
patient  safety (Thakkar & Mears,  2012).  Furthermore, because the markings are often
erased by the prep, the team may assume that the mark has been removed with the
surgical  prep  and  fail  to  stop  the  procedure  on  the  wrong  extremity  (Cobb,  2012).  A
comparative study assessing the clarity and resistance of commercially available pens for
site marking found a wide variation between the clarity of marks made by the different
pens, and also a wide variation in the resistance to skin preparation (Sim et al., 2016). 
In  a  prospective  audit  of  500  surgical  markings  for  elective  procedures   conducted
between 2008 to 2009 in a UK hospital, only 59% of site markings were visible 
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post-surgical draping.  In the remaining cases, the mark could not be seen after draping,
defeating the purpose of marking and increasing the risk for wrong site surgery (Masud et
al., 2010). While Thakkar & Mears (2012) identifies performing the surgical time-out before
skin preparation as a possible remedy to this issue, he states that moving the timeout to
any time other than immediately before the surgical incision creates other opportunities for
misidentification. Unfortunately they fail to expand on what those opportunities are. 
One reason for surgeon’s reluctance to mark too close to the proposed surgical site is the
concern in regard to contaminating the surgical site. Sim et al. (2008) argues that the risks
of wrong-site surgery should always be balanced against infection transmission risk.  The
practice of surgical site marking with non-sterile marker does not affect the sterility of the
surgical field. Surgeons should strongly enforce the necessity to mark the surgical site as
an effective component in preventing wrong site/side surgery (Zhao et al.,  2009).
2.4 Conclusion 
This review has identified a number of interventions introduced in order to eliminate the
possibility of performing wrong site surgery. These included the: ‘Sign Your Site’ campaign;
‘SMaX’  guidelines;  Universal  Protocol;  ‘100,000  Lives  Campaign’;  ‘5  Million  Lives
Campaign’; and  the WHO Safe Surgery Checklist.  Notwithstanding these interventions,
incidence of wrong-patient, wrong-site, wrong-procedure events shows little improvement.
Opportunities  for  error  identified  by  the  literature  include  inaccurate  operating  room
scheduling, poor  patient verification on the day of surgery, incorrect or poor site-marking
practices,  not  being  able  to  identify  the  patient  and/or  site  mark  during  the  time-out
process and mistaken clinical verification of imaging.
Underlying root causes identified include poor communication, miscommunication, missing
information, staff not speaking up and the hierarchical nature of the operating room. The
notion of upstream and downstream errors challenges teams to look more closely at the
patient pathway and identify opportunities for narrowing the margin for error.  The current
approach to patient safety, labelled Safety I, a 'find and fix' model in too linear a model for
such a complex process as healthcare.   
Focus needs to switch to what is known as Safety II: a proactive effort to enable things to
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go  right  more  often.  A proactive  safety  management  concentrates  on  how  everyday
performance usually succeeds rather than on why it seldom fails, and actively attempts to
improve the former rather than simply preventing the latter. 
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3. Organisational Development Process 
“If you want to truly understand something, try to change it” ~ Kurt Lewin (1890-1947)
3.1 Introduction
Against a background of spiralling technological advancements, an increasingly informed
workforce and the  fluidity  of  accepted work  practices,  change is  now an ever-present
feature  of  organisational  life  (Burnes,  2004).  However  while  the  need  for  change  is
recognised,  international  studies  indicate  that  over  70  per  cent  of  all  major  change
initiatives fail to reach intended objectives (Isaksson et al., 2011). 
The aim of this organisational development project was to implement a planned change of
the organisations surgical  ‘Time Out’ process using an OD model  for  change.   In  this
chapter,  an  overview  of  Organisational  Development  is  provided  as  well  as  what
constitutes planned and emergent change and what causes resistance to change.  Models
for  change  are  reviewed  and  the  rationale  for  deciding  on  a  change  model  will  be
explained. Methodology and quality tools used are reviewed including the use of the Plan,
Do, Study, Act (PDSA) cycle. Assessment and reinforcement of the change is discussed
including measurement tools for both hard and soft objectives.
3.2   Organisational Development (O.D.) 
Change  is  a  common  activity  where  managers,  change  agents,  and  staff  members
cooperatively  tackle  a  problem and  reach  a  solution  (Maes  &  Van  Hootegem,  2011).
Organisational  Development is planned change in an organisational  context  (French &
Bell, 1999). The idea of OD is to raise the effectiveness of the organization by focusing on
the  performance  of  groups  and  teams.  Behind  Organization  Development  is  a  deep
humanist and democratic conviction coupled with an emphasis on the advancement of the
organization’s success (Maes & Van Hootegem, 2011).
An OD approach enables the contribution of all those involved in the change, offering the
opportunity to contribute to the continuous improvement process. It facilitates both top-
down and bottom-up influences (McAuliffe & Van Vaerenbergh, 2006). Cummings and
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Worley (2009) outline a number of distinguishing characteristics of the O.D. approach to
change. These include:
 Emphasis on goals and processes as a means of improving capacity to change.
 Change that needs to be sustained over a significant period of time.
 It involves the organization as a whole as well as its parts.
 It is participative and has top management support and involvement.
 It involves a facilitator who takes on the role of a change agent
 It concentrates on planned change but as a process that can adapt to a changing situation.
(Senior & Swailes, 2010).
Organisation  Development  focuses  on  total  system  change.  OD  practitioners  facilitate,
collaborate, and learn with the system. An overarching goal is to make the organisation able to
solve problems on its own by teaching the skills and knowledge of continuous learning. OD
views system improvement as an ongoing process in the context of a constantly changing
environment. It relies on an action research model with extensive participation by those involved
(Senior & Swailes, 2010).What is distinctive about action research and OD is that both
follow a cyclical process of consciously  planning, taking action and evaluating the action,
leading to further planning and so on. The second dimension is that both approaches are
participative; members of the system actively contribute in the cyclical process. The action
research approach is potent, engaging people in seeking ideas, planning, taking actions,
reviewing  outcomes  and  learning  what  works  and  doesn’t  work  (McAuliffe  &  Van
Vaerengergh, 2006).
3.3 Change
Change can be  either  planned  or  emergent  (Maes &  Van  Hootegem,  2011). Planned
change  refers  to  conscious  and  deliberate  actions  to  improve  the  functioning  of  an
organization. It begins from the premise that there is a logical and coherent way to solve
problems.  Clear  objectives  for  change  can  be  determined  and  programmed  to  be
implemented in a systematic way (Senior & Swailes, 2010). Planned change is an iterative
process of analysis, action, and assessment (Cummings & Worley, 2009). It  is starting
intentional actions with the objective of achieving a particular result. This type of change
usually involves a change agent who consciously creates conditions for transforming a
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current situation/process into a new reality (Maes & Van Hootegem, 2011). 
The idea that all change can be planned ignores those unpredicable forces outside the
remit of orgnisations management. Emergent change evolves from variations when people
deal  with  occurances,  breakdowns  and  other  opportunities  in  everyday  work.  Such
changes can only arise by means of action, have no beginning or end and cannot be
predicted  or  planned  (Maes & Van Hootegem,  2011).  However  because of  the  highly
participative nature of Organisational Development, it  has the ability to implement planned
change while at the same time taking account of emergent change through listening to all
those involved in the change process (McAuliffe & Van Vaerenbergh, 2006). 
3.4 Resistance to change 
People  are  the  key component  in  any change process  and  that  which  will  determine
whether  the change succeeds or fails.  Recognising this  and investing in  building their
ability  to  meaningfully  engage  in  the  process  is  an  essential  element  in  any  change
process. With the recognition that change is an ever-present feature of the health care
environment, this building of internal capacity to create an open environment that allows
people to reflect on and learn from their mistakes and failures as well as their successes,
is critical to the future of health care organisations (McAuliffe & Van Vaerenbergh, 2006).
Pugh  (1993)  refers  to  organisations  as  ‘coalitions  of  interest  groups  in  tension’.  The
systematic nature of an organisation, the structures and processes, the culture, politics
and style of leadership are closely linked with the values and attitudes of those who work
there (Senior & Swailes, 2010).
Central  to  the  success  of  organisational  change  is  the  acceptance  of  the  change  by
employees.  Within  this  context,  the  work  of  Kubler-Ross  (1973),  who  argued  that  all
humans  go  through  5  stages  of  ‘grief’  (denial,  anger,  bargaining,  depression  and
acceptance) when faced with a loss or change, has been seen as relevant and has been
applied to the management of organisational change (Barnard & Stoll, 2010). 
Kotter & Schlesinger (1979) identified the four most common reasons people resist change
as: parochial self-interest; misunderstanding and lack of trust; different assessments; and
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low tolerance for change. He argues that dealing with resistance involves education and
communication,  participation  and involvement,  facilitation  and support,  negotiation  and
agreement.  Further  methods  may  include  manipulation  and  co-optation,  explicit  and
implicit  coercion  (Kotter  &  Schlesinger,  1979).  Where  to  strategically  position  effort
depends on the amount and kind of resistance that is anticipated, the relationship of the
initiator to the resisters, the information required for designing the change and the stakes
involved (Kotter & Schlesinger, 1979).
French et al. (2011) suggest that in order to minimise resistance in such cases, the change
agent should make sure that the people affected by the change know specifically how the
change will satisfy the following criteria:
 Benefit: The change should be perceived as ‘a better way’.
 Compatibility:  The change should be compatible with the existing values of those
being asked to change.
 Complexity: The change should be as easy as possible to understand and use.
 Triability:  The  change  should  be  something  that  people  can  try  and  make
adjustments throughout the process.
The assumption that resistance to change is an enemy and should be overcome has not
gone unchallenged.   McAuliffe  & Van Vaerenbergh (  2006)  state  that  on the contrary,
change  agents  should  encourage  participants  to  express  reluctance  to  change  and
suggests  that  identifying  reasons  for  resistance  will  enable  agents  to  recognize  real
problems that must be solved and fears that key actors may have. This approach sits well
with the participative nature of organisational development. 
3.5 Models for Change
Kurt Lewin was one of the first to describe how to direct and control change. His three-
stage model  was the basis  for  most  of  present  day planned change models (Burnes,
2004).   He is  best known for  the development of  field  theory,  group dynamics,  action
research and the three-step model of change (Batras et al., 2014). It is argued that fusion
of these themes is necessary to understand and create change and therefore should be
viewed in their entirety rather than as separate models (Burnes, 2004).
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Lewin’s analysis stems from the conviction that individual behaviour is a function of the
group environment or ‘field’. He believed that individuals are influenced by group norms
and pressure to conform and therefore target for change should be the behaviour of the
group.  Consequently  group  decision-making  is  crucial  in  effecting  lasting  behavioural
change among group members (Batras, 2014).
An action research approach to change involves analysing the current situation, identifying
the array of  possible change solutions and choosing the one that  is  most  appropriate
(Burnes,  2004).  Concurrently,  there  needs  to  be  a  recognised  need  for  change,  a
realization by the group that change is necessary. Furthermore, success through action
research involves buy in at a group level rather than individual level, which is consistent
with the view about group behaviour being the target for change (Burnes, 2004).
3.5.1 Lewin’s 3-Step Model
Lewin (1947) argued that a successful change project involved three steps:
Step 1: Unfreezing. 
Lewin believed that the constancy of human behaviour was based on an equilibrium held
together  by  an  intricate  field  of  driving  and  restraining  forces.  He  argued  that  this
equilibrium  needed  to  be  ‘unfrozen’  before  old  behaviour  can  be  cast-off  and  new
behaviour  successfully  accepted  (Burnes,  2004).  Expanding  on  Lewin’s  ideas,  Schein
(1996) argued that the key to unfreezing was to recognise that change was a profound
psychological dynamic process. Those involved in change have to feel safe from loss and
humiliation before they can accept new information and reject old behaviours. 
Step 2: Moving. 
Lewin believed that it was very difficult to predict a specific outcome from planned change
because of the complexities involved. Instead, those involved in change should take into
account all the forces at work and should identify and evaluate, on a trial and error basis,
all the options available (Lewin, 1947). This is the learning approach promoted by Action
Research.  It  is  this  iterative  approach  of  research,  action  and  more  research  which
enables people to move from a less acceptable to a more desired set of behaviours
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(Burnes,  2004).   This  is  what  Schein (1996)  calls  ‘cognitive restructuring’ which to  be
effective will require people to identify with their new roles. 
Step 3: Refreezing. 
Refreezing seeks to steady the group at a new equilibrium and to confirm that the new
behaviours are relatively established. Refreezing recognises that new behaviour must be
consistent  with  the rest  of  the behaviour  and  the personality and environment of  the
learner(s)  or  it  will  simply  flounder  and  fail  (Schein,  1996).  This  is  why  Lewin  saw
successful change as a group activity, because unless group norms and routines are also
transformed  it  is  difficult  for  the  individual  to  sustain  the  changed  behaviour.  In
organizational  terms,  refreezing often requires changes in  culture,  norms,  policies and
practices (Burnes, 2004; Cummings & Huse, 1989).
Critics of Lewin view his approach to change as simplistic, linear and outmoded. It has
been criticised for  ignoring issues such as organisational  politics and conflict  (Burnes,
2004). Senior and Swailes (2010) in their critique of Lewin’s model concentrate mainly on
his  concept  of  refreezing,  seeing  it  as  ignoring  the  turbulent  environment  of  modern
organisations and the need for continuous change.
Kotter  &  Schlesinger (1979)  builds  on  Lewin’s  model  and  outlines  eight  steps  to
transforming an organization:  to establish a sense of urgency about the need to achieve
change; create a guiding coalition; develop a vision and strategy; communicate the change
vision;  empower broad-based action;  generate short-term wins;  consolidate gains;  and
anchor  new  approaches  in  the  organisations  culture  (Appelbaun,  2011;  Kotter,  1996;
Smith, 2005;). It has been argued that Kotter’s first step could be seen as a sub-process of
unfreezing and that his final step interpreted as a sub-process of refreezing (Isaksson,
2011).
Integration of these eight steps in an orderly fashion is a significant part of Kotter’s model
albeit that the importance of maintaining this order is under investigated. Despite its lack of
theoretical foundation this model has become very popular. It is viewed as intuitive and
relatively easy to  accept  since it  is  based on real-life  experiences (Appelbaun,  2011).
Limitations of Kotter’s model include the rigidity of the approach, the perception that all
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steps may not be relevant to each change process and the criticism that the model is not
detailed  enough  to  provide  help  for  difficulties  that  arise  during  change  management
(Appelbaun, 2011). 
Bullock  and Batten  (1985)  analysed  over  30  change models  and proposed  a  change
model containing four stages: Exploration, Planning, Action and Integration. Every stage
has a number of processes that transform the organization system from one state into
another. They identify the process flow of planned change as: (1) interventions change (2)
the target variables of the organization, which has repercussions on (3) the staff members’
behaviour and in its turn on (4) the organization results. More recent models have been
developed as cyclical  models and although these models replicate similar phases and
processes,  they  depart  from  earlier  models  by  acknowledging  the  dynamic  nature  of
change (Coghlan & Brannick, 2014; Health Service Executive, 2008; Senior & Swailes,
2010,). 
3.5.2 HSE Model of Change: 
The HSE Change Model pays particular attention to the people and cultural aspects of
change. It is built on and reflects the following core principles:
• The needs of service users and local communities together with the interests of
staff are at the core of the change process.
• Integration and a whole-system approach, focuses on connections,  relationships
and dependencies of the system.
• Collaboration  between  different  teams/agencies  and between national  and local
level.
• Active  engagement  and  participation  of  services  users  and  staff  in  the  change
process.
• Emphasis on partnership and team working
• Prioritising  long-term  sustainable  change  and  improved  organisational
effectiveness.
• Transfer of knowledge and skill so that the system equips itself to manage change.
• Processes for organisational learning through regular feedback, measurement and
evaluation at all stages of the change.
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• Locating the responsibility to manage change at all levels of the system, individual,
group and organisational and at local, area and national levels (HSE, 2008)
The HSE Change Model is cyclical and based on four stages of the project management
lifecycle: initiation, planning, Implementation and mainstreaming.  The model recognises
that change must be approached as a continuous process in which all of the stages and
steps are interrelated and influence each other  (HSE, 2008). While it  acknowledges that
efforts spent in the early stages contribute significantly to the successful implementation of
change, its lack of analysis of the current situation was the determinant factor in the writer
not choosing this model. 
3.5.3 Action Research cycle
The  Action  Research  cycle  by  Coghlan  &  Brannick,  (2014)  involves  four  main  steps:
constructing, planning action, taking action and evaluating action. The stakeholders are
engaged to construct what the issues are, action is planned, the plans are implemented
and the outcomes are evaluated. Great emphasis is placed on collaboration at each step
of the cycle and a concurrent reflective cycle is required to ensure action research about
the  action  research  cycle  (Coghlan  &  Brannick,  2014).  This  model  however  fails  to
acknowledge  the  dynamic  nature  of  change  and  the  possibility  that  through  the
collaborative approach, the cycle may need to go back to a previous step before moving
forward. 
3.6 Rationale for the chosen model
3.6.1 The Senior & Swailes model of change:
Current theories of Organisational Development, built on the work of Lewin, recognise that
change is a process that is not linear but complex and messy. It requires many loops back
and forth from one stage of the process to another, thus recognising the dynamic nature of
change (Senior & Swailes, 2010). The model for change chosen for this Organisational
development project is the Senior & Swailes (2010) OD model for change (Figure 2). 
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Figure 2: The Senior & Swailes OD model for change
This model been chosen for the following reasons:
 The model recognises that there is a need to diagnose the situation as it currently
stands and develop a vision for the future. The connection between the current
situation and the future state is dynamic, symbolised by a zigzag arrow. In reality, a
change  process  is  sometimes  reactive,  determined  by  perceived  failings  in  the
current  state  but  can  also  be  proactive,  driven  by  an  identified  opportunity  to
improve, a vision which drives the organisation to reflect on ‘what is’ and look to
‘what could be’
 Whatever the driver for change, gaining commitment to the vision for change is vital
to the success of any project. The level of buy-in from stakeholders depends on the
level of their involvement in the decision making process. Feeding back the findings
from the analysis of the current state, starting a conversation about a future vision,
listening to the organisation rather than ‘shouting from the top’ and recognising the
strength of influence of both formal and informal group leaders are all vital to the
successful implementation of a plan of action (Senior & Swailes, 2010).
 The model moves forward in its stages , developing an action plan, implementing
the change and assessing and reinforcing the change, while all the time recognising
that  it  may be necessary to  move back to  a previous stage during the cyclical
process. This recognises the possibility of changes within changes occurring and
therefore the need to iterate frequently around and across the different stages of the
model (Senior & Swailes, 2010).
 This model for change recognises and places at its centre the change agent. This
acknowledges the importance of those who act as facilitators of change. Moving
people from current to future changed states is challenging and the skills and
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 competencies required may not reside in one individual and may require a team
approach (Senior & Swailes, 2010).  Placing the change agent at the centre of the
model  also  reinforces  the  need  for  a  collaborative  approach  to  organisational
development.  
3.7  Methodology
3.7.1  (a) Present State –Diagnose current situation:
Diagnosing the current situation involves the data collection element of action research and the
feedback of the results for discussion with the stakeholders who are concerned with, and involved
in, the proposed change. Data gathering may include both the internal and external environment
and forms the foundation for all subsequent stages of the OD cycle (Senior & Swailes, 2010). 
The overall aim of this quality improvement was to align the organisations surgical ‘Time
Out’ process with the World Health Organisation (WHO) surgical safety checklist, ensuring
that it was conducted immediately prior to knife to skin. Any change in this process would
therefore require the cooperation of both surgeons and theatre staff. In order to ensure
buy-in, the following methods were employed to diagnose the current situation:
(i) Establishing the structure, processes and outcomes.
Donabedian (1988)  stated that before measuring quality of care, detailed information is
required to demonstrate the linkages between the structure of the setting in which care
occurs, the processes and the outcomes of care. 
In  Donebedian’s  model,  structure  includes  material  properties  such  as  facilities,
equipment, and resources, both financial and human, and the structure of the organisation.
Process represents the act  of  giving care and includes the patient's  and practitioner's
roles.  Outcome signifies  the  result  of  care  on the  health,  wellbeing  and safety of  the
patient. He asserts that good structure influences good processes, and good processes
increase the prospect of good outcomes (Donabedian,1988). 
(ii) Observational audit of ‘Time Out’ process in each of the four theatres
Patient verification and the ‘Time Out’ process were audited on one surgical case in each
of the four operating theatres to identify compliance with the organisations policy.
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 Observational audits have the advantage of being able to collect data on actual behaviour
rather than reported behaviour (Cummings & Worley, 2014). Observation takes place in
real time and enables the reviewer to measure compliance with the established structures
and processes of the organisation.  
(iii) Interviews with both surgeons and staff on the present state and their vision for
the future. 
The importance of involving stakeholders at the earliest  opportunity is  recognised and
comprehensively addressed in the management of change literature (Coghlan & Brannick,
2014; Cummings & Worley, 2014; HSE, 2008;  Kotter & Schlesinger, 1979;  Lewin, 1947;
McAuliffe & Van Vaerenbergh, 2006; Senior & Swailes, 2010). Interviews are a source of
‘rich data’, offer the opportunity to build rapport and display empathy (Cummings & Worley,
2009). 
(iv) A survey of other private hospitals to ascertain practices in regard to ‘Time Out’. 
From discussions held with stakeholders, it became clear that to correctly diagnose the
current state,  it  was necessary to  try and identify what practices are in place in other
hospitals. This was achieved by sending a survey tool to an identified sample of hospitals.
The  advantage  of  this  data  collection  is  that  responses  could  be  quantified  and
summarised  and  the  results  would  perhaps  inform  the  analysis  of  the  planned
improvement.  
(v) A review of current literature
The purpose of reviewing the literature was to clarify and evaluate current literature on the
proposed change. A recent study (Ahmad et al, 2015) demonstrated that the main learning
styles of surgeons are reflector and theorist, 90% and 80% respectively and this is borne
out  through  the  writer’s  experience.   A theoretical  basis  for  the  planned  change  was
therefore extremely important and the search became a dynamic process as discussions
with participants suggested differing search criteria.  
(vi) A review of internal data/reports on the potential for surgical error. 
The organisation culture is ‘Just’ and one of ‘Safety’ and staff are encouraged to report
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 good catches (near misses) and incidents and where available learning opportunities are
identified.   Previous  patient  safety  events  pertinent  to  the  organisation  can  act  as  a
motivator for change as they are tangible rather than abstract examples.   
3.7.2   (b) Future state –   Develop a vision for change          
From the diagnosis of the current state comes the sense and vision of what needs to
change. This progression does not wait for the diagnosis to be complete but rather begins
to evolve early in the process and can bring demands for fresh information and create a
sense that something new is being looked for (Senior & Swailes, 2010). In this project the
close linkage between stages 1(a) and 1(b) resulted in a vision for change which did not
define how the change was to be achieved but rather to define what our future should look
like. That vision agreed was that the organisation will never have a wrong site/side never
event.
3.7.3   Gain Commitment to the vision
The action research cycle of collecting, analysing data and feeding back to stakeholders is
essential at all stages of a change process. Gaining commitment to change must include
working with champions, group leaders and teams to identify and respond to their needs
and concerns rather than simply informing them of the vision and the necessity for change
(Senior & Swailes, 2010). This stage therefore involved the identification of champions,
presentations to both surgeons and staff on never events (Appendix 4), observational audit
findings (Appendix 5), the securement of management sponsorship and an analysis of
stakeholders (Appendix 2). 
3.7.4   Develop an action plan 
Senior & Swailes (2010) identify a number of issues which are important in this stage of
the process. The first is ‘who’ is to guide the planning and implementation of the change.
The second is precisely ‘what’ needs to change to achieve the vision and the third is
‘where’ any intervention should take place. While the writer was the primary change agent
of this project, through collaboration and constant communication, an implementation team
was identified which effectively became a ‘guiding coalition’ (Kotter, 1996). To be effective
Kotter  identifies  four  key  characteristics  for  this  coalition;  position  power,  expertise,
credibility and leadership. 
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The  implementation  team  therefore  consisted  of  representation  from  hospital
management, theatre management, clinical nurse managers, staff and surgeons, including
the chair of the Theatre User Group. While the implementation team itself could not effect
change, it could outline what was to be done by whom and with what kind of involvement
from  others  (Senior  &  Swailes,  2010).  Responsibilities  were  assigned  and  the
methodology of PDSA and associated action plan was agreed. 
3.7.5   Implement the change
Figure 3 – PDSA Model 
Plan:  
Develop a plan to test out the cycle (who, what, where, when)
Who:  Eight consultant surgeons from four specialties, General, Ophthalmic, Orthopaedic 
            and Plastic surgery agreed to participate in the pilot. 
What: - Conduct a secondary verification with the patient’s consultant and anaesthetist 
              when available before the patient is anaesthetised. 
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            - Conduct a second ‘Time Out’ immediately prior to knife to skin on surgical 
               patients whose procedure involved  laterality, multiple structures (e.g. fingers, 
               toes, ribs) and multiple levels (e.g. vertebral column) to ensure that the 
               operation takes place on the correct patient and the correct side and site.
Where:  Theatres 1, 2, 3, 4 
When:  Commence on Monday 1st February until 100 surgeries have been completed.
Do:        
Carry out the change on a small scale (pilot), document any problems and collect data.
See Audit tool (Appendix 6)
Study:  
Analyse data, compare with expectations and summarise. Secure feedback from those
involved in the pilot and present to implementation team.  
Act:      
Make changes as needed and decide whether improvement can be   implemented.
3.7.6   Assess and reinforce the change.
Senior & Swailes (2010) contest that change is an evolving process and must concern
itself  not  only  with  the  quantifiable  performance  objectives  but  also  with  attitudes,
behaviours and cultural issues. Therefore it is imperative that both ‘hard’ data and ‘soft’
issues are measured. Measurement will therefore include data from the audit of the pilot
phase  and  the  opinions,  reflections  and  experiences  of  those  involved  in  the  change
process.  Once  the  change  is  agreed  and implemented,  it  is  necessary to  reinforce  it
through  education  and  training,  appraisal,  career  development  and  reward  systems
(Senior & Swailes 2010).   
3.8     Conclusion
While the team had varying opinions on this change project, all were willing to proceed
with the pilot and any resistance to the planned change was based on the strongly held
belief by some that it would not affect an improvement in patient safety. 
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4. Evaluation 
‘Evaluation  is  making  a  comparative  assessment  of  the  value  of  the  evaluated  or
intervention, using systematically collected and analysed data, in order to decide how to
act’ (Ǿvretveit, J. 1998, pp.9).
4.1 Introduction: 
The  first recommendation in the Institute of Medicine’s (IOM, 2001) report  Crossing the
Quality Chasm was that health care should be safe, timely, effective, efficient, equitable
and patient centred. In order to achieve this, healthcare organisations must continually
improve the services they provide. Increasingly there is demand and pressure to strive
towards improvement and accountability. This has led to regulatory bodies, health insurers
and  patients  looking  for  standardised  quality  measures  such  as  patient  satisfaction,
hospital  readmission  rates  and  other  healthcare  outcomes  (Solberg,  1997).  However
evaluating efforts to improve quality is complex and challenging (The Health Foundation,
2011).   Parry et  al  (2013) recommend that  the guiding question for  those undertaking
evaluation of health care improvement should be ‘How and in what context does the new
model work or can be amended to work?’
This chapter begins with a discussion on the importance of healthcare evaluation and an
overview  of  four  common  evaluation  models.  It  provides  details  of  the  methods  of
evaluation employed and the analysis carried out. The evaluation is directly linked with the
objectives outlined for this development project. 
4.2 The Importance of healthcare evaluation
Green & South (2006) state that healthcare should be evaluated in order to:
 Establish whether or not interventions have worked. 
 Improve health programme implementation 
 Provide accountability to funders 
 Increase support for sustaining or expanding an intervention 
 Contribute to the scientific base for interventions 
 Impact policy decisions  
Three  drivers  for  measurement  have  been  identified;  measurement  for  improvement,
accountability and research. (Solberg, 1997)  The importance of measurement in the
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improvement process is threefold. First it  is necessary to identify those processes that
need improvement. Then it is necessary to measure the particular process in question. 
Thirdly it  is  important to re-measure in order to ascertain if  the intervention has been
effective in improving a process (Solberg, 1997).  Measurement for accountability involves
collection  of  data  on  outcomes  or  results  and  is  intended  to  reveal  and  compare
performance  either  at  an  institutional  level  or  at  an  individual  level.  Measurement  for
research  places  huge  importance  on  verifying  that  measures  and  data  systems  are
precise,  reliable  and valid  as the results  of  research measurement  will  most  likely be
generalised to a specialised group (Solberg, 1997)
The four most  common health evaluations are experimental,  economic,  developmental
and managerial. Each of these perspectives involves a set of assumptions about what is to
be  evaluated,  what  constitutes  valid  knowledge  and  the  best  way  to  measure  this
knowledge. (Ǿvretveit, J. 1998).  Appropriately selected evaluation models allow academic
managers to structure evaluation that accommodates a programmes true complexity (Frye
& Hemmer, 2012).
4.3 Models of Evaluation 
Three models of evaluation are reviewed, Kirkpatrick’s approach; the Logic Model; and the
Context/ Input/Process/Product (CIPP) model.
4.3.1 Kirkpatrick’s four-level evaluation model
Kirkpatrick’s four-level approach is popular as a model for evaluating learner outcomes in
training  programs.  Its  main  contributions  to  educational  evaluation  are  its  focus  on
outcomes and its clear account of outcomes beyond simple learner satisfaction. Kirkpatrick
suggested gathering data to assess four hierarchical ‘‘levels’’ of programme outcomes: (1)
learner satisfaction or reaction to the programme; (2) measures of learning attributed to
the programme; (3) changes in learner behaviour ; and (4) the programme’s final results in
its larger context (Kirkpatrick, D. 1996).
Kirkpatrick’s  model  has  been  criticized  for  not  taking  intervening  variables  that  affect
learning into account and for its assumption of causation between the educational
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 programme and its outcomes (Frye & Hemmer, 2012). This model was not chosen as it is
primarily focused on evaluation of education.
4.3.2 The logic model
Though often used during programme planning as well  as an evaluation approach, the
Logic  Model  structure  strongly  supports  a  coherent  evaluation  plan.  The  four  basic
components  of  the  Logic  Model  are  inputs,  activities,  outputs  and  outcomes  (Frye  &
Hemmer,  2012).  This  model  necessitates  planners to  clearly define  the  intended links
between the programme resources (Inputs), their strategies or treatments (Activities), the
immediate results of activities (Outputs), and the desired accomplishments (Outcomes). 
The Logic Model can ensure that a programme, once implemented, actually focuses on
the intended outcomes (Frye & Hemmer, 2012). Critics of this model argue that its inherent
linearity  can  result  in  evaluators  concentrating  blindly  on  following  the  Model  during
programme implementation without looking for unexpected outcomes or flexibly facilitating
mid-stream changes (Patton 2011).  The linear  nature of  this  model  and its  inability to
generate  evidence  for  causal  associations  between  activities  and  outcomes  (Frye  &
Hemmer,  2012)  led the writer  to  discount  it  as a suitable model  of  evaluation for  this
project. 
4.3.3 The CIPP (context/input/process/product) model. 
The  CIPP  (context/input/process/product)  model was  first  presented  in  1971  and
addresses all  phases of  an  improvement  programme:  its  context,  inputs,  process and
product  (Stufflebeam  &  Shinkfield  2007).  The  efficacy  of  the  CIPP  model  across
educational  and  non-educational  evaluation  settings  has  been  comprehensively
documented (Frye & Hemmer, 2012). The Context study findings provide a useful baseline
for evaluating later outcomes. An Input evaluation can help to assess current practices
against  other  potential  practices.  Its  focus  on  feasibility  and  effectiveness  allows  a
developing project to remain sensitive to the practices most likely to work well (Frye &
Hemmer,  2012).  The Process evaluation  study is  normally  used to  assess a  projects
implementation.  This  study  also  prepares  the  evaluator  to  interpret  the  programme’s
outcomes. The Product evaluation study aims to identify and assess outcomes, including
both positive and negative outcomes, intended and unintended outcomes (Frye &
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Hemmer,  2012).  The  writer  believes  that  this  model  best  suits  evaluation  of  this
improvement  project  and  is  a  good  fit  with  the  Senior  &  Swailes  organisational
development model for change (see Figure. 3).
 
Figure 4: Senior & Swailes OD Model with CIPP evaluation studies 
4.3.4 Methods and measures 
Parry et al (2013) identify the need for evaluation methods to provide an understanding of
why an improvement initiative does or does not work.
Throughout  this  Organisational  Development  project,  both  quantitative  and  qualitative
designs were used. A quantitative approach has an objective reality independent of the
subjects being studied (Yilmaz, 2013). This methodology was employed to ascertain the
organisations present state, ‘Time Out’ practices in other private hospitals and the audit of
the present and changed practice during pilot. A qualitative approach is subjective, reality
or knowledge are socially constructed and the relationship between the knower and the
known are inextricably linked (Yilmaz, 2013). This methodology was used before and after
the  change  project  and  involved  informal  interviews  with  surgeons  and  staff.   These
interviews were a source of rich data and allowed the writer to collect information on a
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 range of possible subjects,  including those which might  become cause for resistance
(Cummings & Worley, 2009).
4.3.4.1 Context evaluation.
A number of data collection and analysis methods lend themselves to a context study,
including  document  reviews,  interviews,  focus  groups  and  surveys  (Frye  &  Hemmer,
2012). For the purposes of this evaluation, policy review, audit, survey and interviews were
conducted in accordance with the objectives outlined for this project. 
Objective 1:  To complete a stakeholder analysis and agree an implementation team
One  of  the  most  important  tasks  during  strategic  change  is  the  management  of  the
interface  between  the  many  competing  demands  of  an  organization’s  stakeholders
(Ackermann, 2011). The identification of the stakeholders for this change project was of
vital  importance  and  the  analysis  was  conducted  with  the  assistance  of  the  theatre
manager (Appendix 2). This analysis identified the following as having high power and
interest: Consultant surgeons, theatre manager, hospital CEO, Quality manager, Theatre
User Group and the Medical Director. Theatre staff were seen as having high interest but
lower  power.  Anaesthetists  were  judged  to  have  high  power  but  lower  interest.  This
determination identified the key players and who best to focus efforts. This analysis also
strongly influenced the membership of the implementation team and it was decided that
powerful stakeholders required representation on the team.
Objective 2:  To conduct an observation audit of ‘Time Out’ practices to identify
(diagnose) the current situation. 
The purpose of this audit was to act as a baseline, assess present practices and identify
opportunities  to  improve.  An  audit  tool  was  constructed  in  accordance  with  the
organisations Protocol to ensure correct site, side, procedure, correct patient surgery (PP-
Org-27). The tool identified the requirements for the verification and ‘Time Out’ process,
documentation in the patient record and evidence of competency training of staff. With the
agreement and assistance of the theatre manager and the verbal consent of the patients
involved, the writer audited the verification and ‘Time Out’ process on four patients, one
undergoing surgery in each of the organisations four theatres.  The audit consisted of
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direct observations from the first contact with the anaesthetic nurse in the theatre reception
to the completion of the ‘Time Out’ process. The number audited was kept small for the
following reasons:
 The purpose of the audit was not to improve compliance with hospital protocol but
simply to confirm the ‘present state’. 
 This form of audit is time consuming 
 The potential for bias due to the Hawthorn effect (Wickström & Bendix, 2000).
 Reluctance to conduct clandestine observation as it might diminish the collaborative
nature of the change project.
Findings  were  documented  and  non-conformances  and  recommendations  identified
(Appendix 6). Findings in relation to the ‘Time Out’ process are displayed below.
Figure 5 : Findings of Observational audit – Note - Criteria in Green relevant to change project.  
Discussion:  
In all four cases, ‘Time Out’ occurred before painting and draping, consent was checked
and confirmed, patient identity was checked with the identity band and case notes, correct
side/site was checked, there was agreement on the procedure and availability of implants
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and images. Correct position was confirmed in three of the cases. In half the processes
audited there was no discussion on concerns and critical  events and no agreement to
proceed verbalised although they are requirements of the policy. Incidentally it was noted
that  the  policy  directed  verification  to  take  place  at  the  theatre  reception  between
anaesthetics  and  ward  nurses  which  meant  that  there  was  no  formal  input  from the
anaesthetist or the patient’s consultant in the process. 
Objective 3: Interviews with both surgeons and staff on the present state and their
vision for the future. 
Parry et al (2013) argue that every evaluation of improvement should start with clarity on
the content and execution of the project and the degree of belief in it.
It  was  decided  to  conduct  informal  interviews  with  both  surgeons  and  clinical  nurse
managers to identify their views and concerns and possible resistance to change. These
interviews allowed themes to emerge and facilitated the construction of a mind map for the
literature review (Appendix 7). The interviews were held informally in the theatre rest area
and the interviewees were allowed to respond unrestrictedly so that new or unexpected
views and experiences could emerge and be captured (Parry et al, 2013). In total seven
Clinical Nurse Managers and fifteen surgeons were interviewed.  The following themes
were identified:
i) Confusion between patient verification and ‘Time Out’
Some surgeons expressed the opinion that ‘Time Out’ should occur while the patient is
awake and can confirm identity, procedure, site and side. There were discussions on the
purpose of verification and the possibility that the patient, due to anxiety or co-morbidity
could misidentify either themselves or the side/site for surgery as outlined in Abecassis
(2015). 
ii) Site marking 
While those surgeons interviewed were happy to comply with the organisations protocol in
regard to marking the surgical site and the use of the standard arrow, there was great
variation among those interviewed on where the site mark should be placed. Some felt that
placing it too close to the incision site compromised the surgical field or could end with
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causing  a  tattooing  effect.  It  was  agreed  that  this  would  be  investigated  during  the
literature review. 
iii) Timing of ‘Time Out’
Both surgeons and nursing staff expressed the concern that moving directly to a change in
practice might compromise the safety of patients and as such wanted any pilot to maintain
the current ‘Time Out’ while adding a further ‘Time Out’ immediately prior to knife to skin.
None  of  those  interviewed  were  happy  to  proceed  directly  to  a  single  ‘Time  Out’
immediately prior to knife to skin. 
iv) Operational issues
As nursing staff are the main drivers of ‘Time Out’ there was some concern that the second
process would take time and cause delays in the surgical list and frustration from their
medical colleagues. They also had concerns about contaminating the sterile field in an
attempt to identify the patient under the drapes.  
Discussion: 
The interview process, while time consuming did have two main positive effects. The first
was that it gave the writer a clearer view of what was required from the search of the
literature.  The  second  and  more  important  result  from  this  process  was  the  level  of
engagement from both surgeons and staff. Opinions were canvassed and given openly,
concerns were heard and discussed in an honest and frank manner and champions were
identified and secured as members of the implementation team. 
Objective 4: To conduct a survey of other private hospitals to ascertain practices in
regard to ‘Time Out’. 
Senior and Swailes (2010) state organisations should gather data from within and about
their  external  environment.  Establishing  the  practices  in  regard  to  ‘Time Out’  in  other
hospitals was considered to be necessary and had been planned during stage 1 (a) of the
project. However due to delays in Ethical approval and the concern that findings might
influence the project, the survey, while conducted,  did not take place until March and was
limited to private hospitals.  
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The survey tool was constructed based on the  National Policy and Procedure for Safe
Surgery (Quality and Patient Safety Directorate, 2013) and drafted in consultation with the
theatre  manager  and  a  number  of  surgeons.  The  tool  consisted  of  fourteen  closed
questions concerning policy, checklist, those present during ‘Time Out’, who leads on the
process, the timing of ‘Time Out’,  patient positioning, patient identification, site marking
and some background information on the respondents organisation (Appendix 8).  The tool
was piloted during a theatre educational open day in the organisation in January 2016. 
The population agreed was the private hospitals in Ireland who are members of the Private
hospitals representative body.  This population was selected as the writer is a member of a
subcommittee of this group and could gain buy in for the completion of the survey. There
are twenty members in this group, three of whom do not have a surgical department and
as such were out ruled. Another hospital does not presently have a representative on the
committee and so was also out ruled. The survey was therefore sent to sixteen hospitals.  
In advance of survey, information regarding the writer, the purpose of the survey and the
intended tool was circulated to prospective respondents (Appendix 9.). This was followed
up the following day with a link to a web-based survey provider and was the respondents
were asked to complete the survey on line. In total  eleven hospitals responded to the
survey, yielding a response rate of 69%. The findings are outlined in Table 1/2 & Figures
6/7.
Survey Results Yes No
Does your Hospital have a 
policy/procedure for safe surgery? 100% (11) 0%
Has policy been developed in line with 
the National Policy and Procedure for 
Safe Surgery (2013)? 
100% (11) 0%
Does your theatre department use a 
safe surgery checklist? 91% (10) 9%(1) 
Table 1: Survey results – Policy checklist 
47
Figure 6 – Survey Results- Who leads on time out.
Always Usually Sometimes 
Is the consultant or operating
surgeon who will be 
performing the skin incision 
present for timeout?
80% (8) 20% (2) 0%
Is the patient positioned 
before timeout is called?
30% (3) 40%(4) 30% (3)
Can the patient identity band 
be accessed during timeout?
82% (9) 0% 18% (2)
When necessary, is the 
surgical site mark visible 
during timeout
73% (8) 18% 2) 9% (1)
Table 2: Survey results – ‘Time out ‘criteria 
Figure 7: Survey results – Timing of ‘Time Out’ 
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Discussion: 
All hospitals surveyed had a policy in place which was developed in line with the national
policy.  Only one hospital  did  not  use a checklist.  80% of  respondents stated that  the
consultant was always present for time out. There was a large disparity when it came to
the patient positioning and 82% could always access the ID band during time out. 9% of
respondents  stated  that  the  site  mark  was  sometimes  visible  during  timeout.  55% of
hospitals conduct ‘Time Out’ before painting and draping with 45% doing so before knife to
skin. 
These results show the wide diversity that exists in Ireland regarding ‘Time out’ practices
and most of those organisations survey also possess JCI accredited status. 
4.3.4.2 Input evaluation
Input  evaluation  asks,  “How should  it  be  done?”  and  identifies  process  designs  and
approaches that will  most likely achieve the desired results (Zhang, et al, 2011). When
applied to a process already in place, it can help assess current practice against other
potential practices, focusing on feasibility and effectiveness (Frye & Hemmer, 2012). 
Basic  input  evaluation  measures  include  a  proposed  plan’s  relevance,  feasibility,  and
advantage  to  other  approaches,  cost,  and  projected  cost-effectiveness.  Literature
searches,  use of  advocate teams,  and pilot  trials  are all  suitable tools  to  identify and
assess different project tactics (Zhang, et al, 2011). 
The inputs required for this project were as follows:
 Stake holder analysis (Appendix 2)
 Review of literature, evaluation of which is outlined in Chapter 2
 Implementation team which included five surgeons,  six clinical  nurse managers,
theatre manager and change agent. 
 Agree audit tool for pilot 
Cost  implications  of  proposed change were  minimal.  Printing  of  audit  tools  was  done
internally. There was no anticipated loss of time or need to reduce the surgical list. The
time spent by the implementation team in the planning and review of this project was given
freely. 
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4.3.4.3 Process evaluation
Process  evaluation  monitors  the  project  implementation  process.  It  asks,  “Is  it  being
done?” and provides an ongoing check on the project’s progress. Important aims of this
evaluation include recording the process and providing feedback regarding the extent to
which the planned actions are carried out and whether changes or amendments of the
plan  are  necessary  (Zhang,  et  al,  2011).   This  study  is  invaluable  for  supporting
accountability to the project stakeholders and allows for the data collection required for the
projects continued improvement (Frye & Hemmer, 2012). 
The pilot began on February 1st 2016 and was confined to those surgeons identified during
the planning process and to procedures involving laterality, multiple structures and multiple
levels. The theatre manager took a strong lead during the pilot phase, liaising with clinical
nurse managers to ensure that the second ‘Time Out’ was conducted as agreed. Audit
tools were available in each of the theatres and completed for the agreed consultants lists.
Evaluation:
 All eight of the consultants identified during the planning phase participated in the
pilot. 
 100% of  the surgeries which fitted the criteria  were  audited.  The breakdown of
cases by specialty is displayed in the graph below. 
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Figure 8: Percentage of Surgeries by Speciality 
 40% of Surgeons and 59% of anaesthetists conducted a secondary 
verification with the patient before the administration of anaesthesia.
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Figure 9: Patient verification by Consultants 
 A second ‘Time Out’ was performed in 100% of the surgeries meeting the
criteria of the pilot. 
Discussion: 
Whilst  the  suggestion  to  pilot  a  second  verification  process  came  from  one  of  the
surgeons, compliance among surgeons and anaesthetists was 40% and 60% respectively.
Some of the consultants felt that they had only recently met with the patient and did not
see the value of the secondary verification. The surgeon was not always available when
the patient  arrived in  the theatre,  sometimes having to  go to  consent  another patient.
Anaesthetists  had  a  higher  rate  of  participation  and  including  them in  the  verification
process in the future is one of the recommendations of this report.  
4.3.4.4 Product evaluation
The final  evaluation  in  the  CIPP model  is  Product  evaluation.  This  type of  evaluation
identifies and assesses the project outcomes including positive and negative outcomes
(Frye & Hemmer, 2012).  It asks, “Did the project succeed?”  First, it provides cumulative
information  that  can be used to  judge the  facts  and effects  of  the project.  Second,  it
provides formative information that can be used to make changes and improvement to the
project for future implementation. Finally it offers insights on the project’s sustainability and
transferability (Zhang, et al, 2011). Stufflebeam and Shinkfield (2007) propose that a
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combination of techniques should be used to assess outcomes. Doing so helps cross-
check the different findings. Product evaluation of this project therefore includes review of
the  findings from the  pilot  and the  feedback from the  interviews  held  with  those who
participated in the pilot. 
Findings:
Results of the pilot are displayed below. Four criteria were agreed for audit:
i) Confirmation of patient identity
ii) Confirmation of site mark
iii) Confirmation of side of surgery 
iv) Confirmation of procedure
Figure 10: Pilot outcomes
Discussion:  
Evaluation of outcomes is included under the criteria for audit and for ease of reporting will
incorporate both the statistical findings and feedback from interviews. 
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Confirmation of patient identity:  While the ability to identify the patient remained high at 
94%, this statistic did not reflect inherent difficulties to reach that compliance level.
Subsequent interviews with staff highlighted significant difficulty in accessing the patients 
ID band once the patient was painted and draped and it became apparent during interview
that some staff, in order to do their best to comply with the requirements, cut off the ID 
band to overcome these difficulties albeit that they knew this to be an inherently unsafe 
practice.  Serious concern was expressed by staff about the fear of compromising the 
sterility of the surgical field. 
Confirmation of site mark:   The site mark was visible in only 58% of the secondary ‘Time 
Out’ processes. This is a significant drop and was due to two main reasons. The first 
cause of loss of visibility was the location of the site mark and its occlusion by the surgical 
drapes. The second cause was down to the removal of the mark during the painting 
process. Interviews with participating consultants and staff acknowledged that while there 
are opportunities to improve marking practices in the hospital, some surgeries (particularly 
in ophthalmic surgery) afford little opportunity to mark the side/site in an area which will 
remain visible once the patient is draped. There was also reluctance on behalf of some of 
the consultants to mark too close to the site of incision.  
Confirmation of side of surgery:  In only one case did staff report being unable to confirm 
side of surgery. This was due to the fact that the side was not documented on the patient 
consent form. During interview, staff clarified that their confirmation of side during the 
secondary ‘time out’ and in the absence of a visible site mark, was made solely on what 
was documented in the consent. 
Confirmation of procedure:   In all cases staff were able to confirm the procedure by 
referring to the consent form. However during interview, some staff expressed the concern 
that the theatre listing does not always match exactly what is documented in the individual 
patients consent form. This reflects what Paull et al (2015) refers to as ‘upstream’ margin 
for error relating to the Universal Protocol. This mismatch has serious potential for error as
staff other than the nurse who performs the verification use this list when setting up the 
theatre and position equipment without reference to the consent form.  
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Final Comments:
The feedback from both staff and consultants was indeed rich and it was obvious that 
those involved were engaged and eager to do what was in the best interests of the patient.
The main points highlighted were as follows:
 Checking the patients identity once painted and draped was a big issue for 
the nursing staff, described by one nurse as a “nightmare” for the reasons 
outlined above. This was particularly relevant in some orthopaedic cases.  
 Once painting and draping commences, staff are busy, plugging in diathermy,
picking items, arranging drapes etc. and could easily be distracted. 
 Painting and draping is seen as the start of the procedure, patient is in 
position and “once the surgeon paints & drapes, it is a challenge to get them 
to stop”. 
 Some staff and consultants felt that once the patient is draped, they lose the 
anatomical context of the patient, they “cannot see the landmarks” and this 
they believe increases the risk to the patient. 
 Although the writer could find no evidence of a linkage between site marking 
and tattooing, some surgeons stated that they have experience of patients 
questioning the “blue mark” at follow up. 
 The  overwhelming  conclusion  from  all  involved  and  the  decision  of  the
implementation  team  is  that  this  change  should  not  be  implemented  at
present but the team have made recommendations which will be outlined in
Chapter 5. 
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5. Discussion & Conclusions
“There is nothing wrong with change, if it is in the right direction”. - Winston Churchill 
(1874-1965)
Introduction
This OD project, on the face of it was a simple matter of moving a process forward by a
number of  minutes.   At  the outset  it  appeared to  some that  it  barely warranted a full
Organisational  Development  project.  However,  the  writer  knew  that  the  organisations
current practice had not evolved by accident but because it was perceived to be the safest
way to do ‘Time Out’.  
This chapter draws together the findings of this project, how the programme was shaped
by the review of literature and the writers experience of introducing this change project.
The writer will also analyse the impact of this project on the organisation, the opportunities
for improvement identified and the contribution it can make to practice and possibly theory.
In conclusion, while this project did not achieve its stated aim and was not implemented,
where the organisation goes from here and how we affect change which will strengthen
our patient safety systems will be the measure of our success. 
 
5.1.     First do no harm
Despite the relatively infrequent occurrence of wrong site surgery it continues to happen
and  it  is  one  of  the  events  that  both  surgeons  and  theatre  staff  fear  the  most.
Notwithstanding  all  of  the  interventions  from the  Joint  Commission,  the  World  Health
Organisation and many others, one hundred and eleven events were reported to the Joint
Commission in 2015 (Appendix 3) and sixty three wrong site surgeries have been reported
in Irish hospitals since 2011(Irish Times, 2016). The literature is rich with information on
‘never events’ and  what root causes of these incidents have been identified (Abecassis,
2015; Blanco et al., 2009; Michaels et al., 2007; Stahel, 2014).  It makes for stark reading
particularly as the results resonate with our own experiences and are mirrored in some the
evaluations  during  this  change  project.  Blanco  et  al.,  (2009)  finding  that  in  56%  of
occurrences the surgical site was not visible during ‘Time Out’ is concerning as the site
mark was not visible in 42% of cases after painting and draping during this project. 
56
5.2    Where theory meets practice
At the start of this project time was spent in ascertaining current practice and discussing
with key stakeholders the vision for change. Through collaboration and honest discussion
a plan was decided and a vision for change agreed. The vision was that the organisation
will  never have a never event and it  was hoped that this change would decrease the
likelihood of  that  happening.  There were  concerns however  and through the interview
process surgeons and staff were encouraged to outline their fears so that they could be
researched in the literature and hopefully allayed. This is also why the dual system was
agreed, the change agent could not ethically or morally suggest that individuals change
their  practice to what  was perceived to  be a less safe one.  The following paragraphs
summarise some of the key findings.
Site Marking   
Visibility of the site mark was one of the areas highlighted by both surgeons and nursing
staff as being a huge concern in the changed process and indeed is well documented in
the literature. While some consultants did agree that there was opportunity to improve their
practices and one surgeon changed his practices during the pilot, the consensus was that
‘time  out’  should  occur  when  the  site  mark  is  visible  and  that  is  before  painting  and
draping. Cobb (2012) argues that a mark washed of by surgical prep may pose more of a
threat to the patient. 
Patient identity
While reduction in the ability to identify the patient only dropped by 6%, there was no doubt
in the subsequent interviews that this posed a serious challenge for nursing staff. In the
survey of  hospitals,  82% of  respondents  indicated  that  they could  always  identify  the
patient during time out, Vats  et al.,  (2010) suggest conducting time out prior to draping
because otherwise name bands cannot be accessed without compromising sterility. 
Confirmation of Procedure 
During this change project it was noted that the reporting of near misses (locally called
Good Catches) increased substantially as staff, with heightened awareness noted lack of
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laterality on theatre list details or on consent forms. This is described by Paull et a., (2015)
as upstream and downstream errors which can occur weeks before the patient reaches
the hospital. 
Loss of anatomical context
Loss of visibility of the patient’s position once draped is challenging and can confusion
regarding laterality. Seiden (2006) argues that when the patient is covered with drapes, it
necessitates serious mental effort for the surgeon to determine right from left. This has
been found to be particularly challenging for orthopaedic and spinal surgery. In interviews
following the change pilot,  both surgeons and nursing staff  referred to  the draping as
losing sight of the landmarks. 
Organisational impact
This OD project has had a positive impact on the organisation and particularly on the staff
who participated.  Awareness of the issues surrounding never events and patient safety in
theatre has been greatly heightened and anecdotally staff are reporting that already some
practices in regard to site marking and verification of patients have changed. Reporting of
good catches has increased three fold and theatre staff are highlighting poor scheduling
information to consultant secretaries. 
Contribution to practice/theory
It is hoped that the findings of this project can be published and start a debate about the
timing of ‘Time Out’. 55% of the hospitals surveyed conduct time out before painting and
draping and the national policy allows for this practice to be adapted locally. Concerns are
to be found in the literature and a review of the articles references by the WHO in their
guiding document did not yield any success on a secure evidence base for their mandate
that the process occur prior to knife to skin. 
5.3 Strengths of this project
While the project did not achieve its aim to have ‘time out’ conducted immediately prior to
knife to skin in 100% of surgeries, this does not mean that the change project is at an end.
A number of opportunities for improvement have been identified and will  be outlined in
recommendations for future improvements .
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5.4 Limitations
The main limitation to this study is that the writer was not in a position to conduct the
survey  in  public  hospitals.  To  have  survey  data  from  the  public  system  would  add
considerably  to  the  knowledge  of  where  Irish  hospitals  are  in  relation  to  ‘Time  out’
practices. 
5.5 Ethical considerations
The writer received ethical approval to conduct the survey from her organisations Clinical
Ethics Committee.
5.6 Recommendations for future improvements
Following  a  meeting  of  the  implementation  team  and  a  review  of  Joint  Commission
targeted solutions the following are recommendations for further improvements:
1) Review scheduling practices and the possibility of cross referencing the surgeon’s
notes with the consent form and theatre lists.
2) Review verification process to formally involve the anaesthetist in the process.
3) Review site  marking  practices  with  surgeons so that  where  possible  the  site  is
visible after painting and draping.
4) Review markers used for site marking 
5) Review organisational policy and amend to reflect any changes agreed. 
6)  Look at opportunities to improve practice by examining what is going right as well
as what happens when something goes wrong.
This is not the end but rather the beginning. It is now down to the organisation  and all
those involved to take the learning from this change project and progress it into something
meaningful and potentially transformational.  
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Appendix 1
Project Plan
ID Task Name Start Finish Duration
20162015
FebDecOctAug NovSep Jan
1 8w 4d30/10/201501/09/2015Complete a stakeholder analysis and agree implementation team 
3 8w 3d30/11/201501/10/2015Conduct interviews with surgeons/staff
5 29w 1d22/07/201601/01/2016Conduct a survey of hospitals 
13w 1d31/12/201501/10/2015Complete literature review
6 4w 3d02/03/201601/02/2016Implement change of practice on pilot basis 
7 3w01/04/201614/03/2016Complete pilot and analyse data 
8 4w 1d29/04/201601/04/2016Full implementation 
Mar Apr
4
2 8w 4d30/10/201501/09/2015Conduct an audit of ‘Time out’ practices 
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Appendix 2
Stakeholder Analysis
High    Consultant Surgeons
Theatre Manager
CEO/Management
Quality/Safety Managers
Theatre User Group
Medical Director
POWER Anaesthetists
Patients Theatre Staff
Ward Staff
Low
Low INTEREST High
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Appendix 3
Observation Audit Tool
Audit of verification and time out process in accordance with PP Org 27 – Section 2.2 – 3.5 
Date: 28/09/15         
Requirements Findings Non Conformance/
Recommendation  
Verification
Correct identification
Verification process reviewed at theatre 
reception for 2 of the 4 patients 
Refer. Doc BSHG 102 Rev. 11
Patient: 1 – This verification was not 
observed so audit based on documentation. 
Identification ticked. 
Patient: 2 – Verification observed. 
Anaesthetic nurse asked patient to confirm 
name and date of birth and checked patient 
ID band. 
Patient: 3 - Verification observed. 
Anaesthetic nurse asked patient to confirm 
name and date of birth and checked patient 
ID band. 
Patient: 4 - This verification was not 
observed so audit based on documentation. 
Identification ticked.
Pin not included
Verification conducted 
very well 
Very good handover of 
patient, very thorough
Pin not included 
LMP –Pregnancy – 
indicated as N/a but 
patient within 
childbearing years – 
pregnancy test carried 
out
Add reference to Patient
identification policy 
Site marked- visual 
check
Patient: 1 – Performed by consultant in the 
anaesthetic room, this is in accordance with
policy PP ORG 27 
Patient: 2 – site mark not applicable in this 
case 
Patient: 3 – Site was visually checked at 
theatre reception
Patient: 4 – Marked as checked –visually 
checked at reception
Nurse questioned had a 
very good knowledge of
the process
Nurse questioned knew 
process but vague on 
certain specifics of the 
process
Consent Patient: 1 – Consent  checked
 Patient: 2 – Consent checked 
Patient: 3 – Consent checked
Patient: 4 – Consent checked
 
Procedure Patient: 1 – Procedure was confirmed 
Patient: 2 – Procedure confirmed 
Patient: 3 – Procedure confirmed
Patient: 4 – Procedure confirmed
Side and site Patient: 1 – This was done in anaesthetic 
room with availability of ultrasound 
guidance Patient: 2 – Site only on 
confirmation checklist – verification section
and no opportunity for N/A
Patient: 3 – Confirmed with patient
Patient: 4 – Confirmed with patient 
Add  side and Not 
applicable to site to 
BSHG 102 Rev. 11
A/A
Scrub nurse verifies
 Equipment  
Patient: 1 – no evidence of same
Patient: 2 – no evidence of same
Patient: 3- no evidence of same
Patient: 4 - no evidence of same
PP-ORG-27 states in 
2.3 the circulating/scrub
nurse will verify that 
any required medical 
technology and/or 
implants are available- 
no evidence of this 
process occurring,  need
to amend pre-operative 
verification section of  
BSHG 102 Rev 11
Time out immediately 
prior to surgery
Patient: 1 – immediately before painting 
and drapes 
Patient: 2 – immediately prior to painting 
and draping
Patient: 3 - – immediately prior to painting 
and draping
Patient: 4 – immediately prior to painting 
and draping
Consultant would have 
conducted time out 
prior to scrubbing but 
staff declined to 
participate
Anaesthetist while 
present did not actively 
participate.
Consent Patient: 1 – did refer to consent and 
confirmed accuracy
Patient: 2 – did refer to consent  and 
confirm accuracy
Patient: 3 - did refer to consent  and 
confirm accuracy
Patient: 4 - did refer to consent  and 
confirm accuracy
Patient identity Patient: 1 – Confirmed by checking wrist 
band and patient notes
Patient: 2 - Confirmed by checking wrist 
band and patient notes
Patient: 3 - Confirmed by checking wrist 
band and patient notes
Patient: 4 – Confirmed by checking wrist 
band and patient notes
Correct side/site Patient: 1 – Checked with consent form and
markings 
Patient: 2 – Not applicable
Patient: 3 – Operative site marked once 
positioned 
Patient: 4 – Checked with consent form and
marking
Accordance with policy 
Marked side pre-
operatively and the site 
at time of positioning
Agreement on 
procedure
Patient: 1 – Agreement from the team
Patient: 2 – Agreement from the team 
Patient: 3 – Agreement from the team
Patient: 4 – Agreement from the team
Correct Position Patient: 1 – Position not confirmed 
Patient: 2 – Position was confirmed 
Patient: 3 – Position was confirmed
Patient: 4 – Position was confirmed
Good reference to 
previous THR
Active participation 
from consultant 
Active participation 
from consultant
Availability of implants
etc
Patient: 1 – Mentioned 
Patient: 2 – Mentioned
Patient: 3 – Actively confirmed 
Patient: 4 – Actively confirmed 
Availability of imaging Patient: 1 – mentioned 
Patient: 2 - mentioned
Patient: 3 – Displayed
Patient: 4 – Displayed
Images displayed and 
confirmed 
Concerns Patient: 1 – team disbanded before this was 
completed 
Patient: 2 – Direct question to anaesthetist,  
anaesthetist did not actively participate
Patient: 3 – Direct question to anaesthetist 
and actively participated
Patient: 4 – Direct question to anaesthetist 
and actively participated
Critical events 
considered
Patient: 1 – discussed between circulating 
nurse and anaesthetist only – entire team 
not involved. 
Patient: 2 - Direct question to anaesthetist, 
did not actively participate 
Patient: 3 – Direct question to anaesthetist 
and actively participated
Patient: 4 – Direct question to anaesthetist 
and actively participated
Initiated by scrub nurse
Patient: 1 – Initiated by circulating nurse 
and consultant then took lead.
Patient: 2 – Initiated by circulating nurse 
Patient: 3 – Initiated by anaesthetic nurse
Patient: 4 – Initiated by circulating nurse 
Team present Documentation reviewed – BSHG 106/Rev 
11
Patient: 1 – all team names were 
documented and ticked present
Patient: 2 - all team names were 
documented but not marked as present
Patient: 3 - all team names were 
documented but not marked as present
Patient: 4 - all team names were 
documented but not marked as present
Consent Patient: 1 – marked as confirmed
Patient: 2– marked as confirmed
Patient: 3– marked as confirmed
Patient: 4– marked as confirmed
Correct site, patient, 
position and equipment
Patient: 1 – marked as confirmed
Patient: 2 - marked as confirmed 
Patient: 3– marked as confirmed
Patient: 4– marked as confirmed
Concerns Patient: 1 - marked as confirmed
Patient: 2 – marked as confirmed 
Patient: 3– marked as confirmed
Patient: 4– marked as confirmed
Sign and time Patient: 1 – signed and timed
Patient : 2 – Signed and timed
Patient: 3 – signed and timed but time very 
difficult to read 
Patient : 4 – Signed and timed
Procedure not to start 
until questions are 
resolved
Patient: 1 – no discussion on whether ok to 
proceed.
Patient: 2 - no discussion on whether ok to 
proceed.
Patient: 3 – definite confirmation of 
agreement to proceed.
Patient: 4 – definite confirmation of 
agreement to proceed.
Training AOT – While the competency checklist 
includes sign off on Time out and 
verification process by CNM 11, the staff 
member in question has not signed that 
section of the document.  Training occurred
on 19/08/2014 but states ‘Discussion on 
Practices’ (Rev. 2)
AS - The competency checklist includes no 
sign off on Time out and verification 
process by CNM 11, the staff member in 
question has  signed that section of the 
document – February 2009 (Rev. 2)
MS - The competency checklist includes no
sign off on Time out and verification 
process by CNM 11, the staff member in 
question has  ticked that section of the 
document –27/09/2010 (Rev. 1). 
Review competency 
documentation for 
double signatures and 
date per competency
Ensure correct version 
of document is used
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Appendix 4
Pilot Audit Tool
Time Out Pilot – Audit Tool
Date: ___________________   Speciality: __________________________________
Number of Patients: __________________________________
Criteria               
Hospital No.
Procedure
Before
Draping
Verification of 
Patient/Consultant
S          A S          A S         A S         A
Patient Identity 
Confirmed
Y         N Y         N Y         N Y         N
Site Mark Confirmed & 
Visible
Y         N Y         N Y         N Y         N
Side Confirmed Y         N Y         N Y         N Y         N
Consent for Planned 
Procedure
Y         N Y         N Y         N Y         N
Before 
knife to 
skin
Patient Identity 
Confirmed
Y         N Y         N Y         N Y         N
Site Mark Confirmed & 
Visible
Y         N Y         N Y         N Y         N
Side Confirmed Y         N Y         N Y         N Y         N
Consent for Planned 
Procedure
Y         N Y         N Y         N Y         N
Comments if No
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Appendix 5
Mind Map – Surgical Time Out
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Appendix 6
Survey Tool
Time Out Questionnaire
             1. Does your hospital have a policy/procedure for Safe Surgery? 
                           Yes                          No                      Other (Please specify)
             2.          If yes to above, has this policy been developed in line with the National Policy and 
Procedure for Safe Surgery (2013)?
                           Yes                          No                 
     
            3.           Does your theatre department use a safe surgery checklist?
            4.          Please indicate how your department has implemented the checklist.
□ We have implemented the entire checklist.
          □ We have implemented a modified version of the checklist.
□ Other – Please specify.
            
              5.         Is the consultant or operating surgeon who will be performing the skin incision    
present for ‘Time out’
                          □ Always
□ Usually
□ Sometimes.
□ Rarely
□ Never.
               6. Who leads on ‘timeout’.
□ Surgeon
□ Anaesthetist
□ Anaesthetic nurse.
□ Scrub Nurse
□ Circulating Nurse.
□ Other.
           7.           When does surgical timeout occur?
□ (a)   Before painting and draping.
□ (b)   After painting and draping and immediately prior to knife to skin
                    □ (c)   Either (a) or (b) depending on surgeons preference 
                           □ Other. Please specify.
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8.         Is the patient positioned before time out is called?
                          □ Always
□ Usually
□ Sometimes.
□ Rarely
□ Never.
9. During timeout how is the patient identity confirmed.
□ By checking the patient’s identity bracelet.
□ By checking the patient’s record including consent 
□ By checking the patient identity bracelet and patient consent & record.
□ Other. Please specify.
10. Can the patient identity band be accessed during timeout.
□ Always
□ Usually
□ Sometimes.
□ Rarely
□ Never.
11. When necessary is the surgical site mark visible during timeout.
□ Always
□ Usually
□ Sometimes.
□ Rarely
□ Never.
           12 .        If site mark is not visible during time out is this because:
    
□ The mark is occluded by the drapes
□ The mark has been compromised by skin preparation 
□ Both of the above
□ Other. Please specify.
           13. Please indicate the type of organisation.
□ Public HSE Hospital
□ Private Hospital.
□ Voluntary Hospital.
□ Other.
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           14. Please indicate the number of operating rooms in your department.
1   ………………………………………… 20
Thank you for taking the time to complete this survey.
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Appendix 7
Information Leaflet for Survey
                          Information Leaflet for Participants                        
Study title:  Pause for thought: Surgical Time Out, before or after draping? A Quality 
Improvement project. 
Surveyors Name:                                                              Margaret Mc Hugh
Telephone number: 087 2617156
Dear Colleague, 
I am an MSc student in Quality and Safety in Healthcare at the RCSI. As part of my Organisational 
Development project, I wish to ascertain current practices in Irish hospitals in relation to the 
implementation of the National Policy and Procedure for Safe Surgery and the timing of Surgical 
Time Out.  
The purpose of this survey is to determine how widely the National Policy has been
implemented and when Surgical Time Out is conducted. 
In Ireland, the timing of surgical Time Out is not clearly defined. The National Policy and Procedure 
for Safe Surgery states that while before skin incision is the recommended time to complete the 
“Time Out” based on the WHO recommendations,  if individual organisations wish to perform the 
“Time Out” prior to skin preparation and draping the patient this may be adapted locally (Quality 
and Patient Safety Directorate, 2013).
I would welcome and value your participation in this survey. If you consent to participate, a simple 
survey tool with 11 questions will be forwarded via Survey Monkey in the coming days. Please 
follow the link to Survey Monkey and complete the survey. 
Your participation is voluntary and all responses will be anonymised. Data collected during the 
survey process will be analysed and frequency statistics will be reported. 
This survey will take less than 2minutes to complete. Findings from this survey will be made 
available on request and I hope will inform quality improvement initiatives in safe surgery practices
in the future. 
Please find attached information outlining the questions. If you need any further information in 
relation to this survey, please do not hesitate to contact me.
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Name: Margaret McHugh
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